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ABSTRACT 
My first essay examines the degree to which the market prices of publicly traded firms 
reflect and respond to new information regarding the economic viability and vitality of 
organizations to which they are strategically linked.  More specifically, I exploit the uniquely 
transparent nature of the lessor-lessee relationship across commercial real estate markets to 
evaluate whether future returns to real estate investment trusts (REITs) are systematically affected 
by the financial return performance and/or operational opacity of the tenants who lease their 
investment properties.  Using a hand collected data set identifying the principal tenants of 96 
publicly traded REITs, I find those firms with the best performing tenants generate annualized 
abnormal returns which are approximately six percent higher than those realized by REITs with 
the worst performing tenants.  These results are robust to a variety of model specifications, and a 
closer inspection of the results reveals these performance differentials are consistent with emerging 
evidence across the literature suggesting investors' limited attention materially influences the 
return predictability of assets.  With respect to the current investigation, I thus conclude investors' 
limited attention leads to the failure of REIT prices to fully reflect the valuation implications of 
their tenants’ return performance. 
My second essay investigates how sophisticated investors, such as short sellers, trade on 
information along the supply chain. Short sellers are known to be generally better informed than 
common investors. Given the economic linkages that exist between the suppliers and customers, 
one would expect short sellers to trade on such information. My results indicate that short interest 
predicts unexpected earnings news, consistent with short sellers extracting information from 
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economic relationships. When I evaluate stock return and short interests in regression analysis, I 
find strong negative relation between short interest in supplier firm and the future stock returns for 
the customer firm for the return in the next month. The negative relation persists for twelve months.  
I find similar results from portfolio approach. I argue that one plausible channel that explains the 
information content of supplier (customer) firm’s short interest for the customer (supplier) firms 
is short sale constraints on the customer (supplier) firms. My results are consistent with this 
explanation. Overall, my findings suggest that short sellers play an important role in the price 
discovery of related firms on supply chain, beyond their direct effects documented previously.   
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ESSAY1: INVESTORS’ LIMITED ATTENTION: EVIDENCE FROM 
REITS  
1. Introduction 
Market efficiency implies that any new information regarding an asset is fully reflected 
and instantaneously incorporated into its current market value.  In practice, such asset market 
efficiency requires investors to both: 1) provide full attention to all available information regarding 
a firm, and 2) continuously incorporate new information into their investment decision making.  
For example, one potentially important source of information regarding future firm returns is the 
financial performance of other firms to which it is economically linked.  Interestingly, however, 
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find investors are often inattentive to the full implications of such 
relations, and further argue such inattention may result in systematic return predictability across 
related assets.  Their evidence is also consistent with models of limited attention and gradual 
information flow, where attention constraints cause related firm information to diffuse slowly 
across investors, thereby generating predictable returns (Hong and Stein 1999; Hirshleifer et al. 
2009; Hirshleifer et al. 2011). 
Building upon these foundations, the current investigation explores the valuation 
consequences of investor limited attention in real estate markets.  More specifically, exploiting the 
unique transparency of the tenant-landlord relationship in commercial real estate markets, I 
evaluate the extent to which performance information regarding an income producing property’s 
tenants affects the future returns of their landlords.  Throughout this analysis, I focus on real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) and the markets in which they operate.  REIT markets provide an 
appropriate setting and compelling laboratory for testing investors’ attention for multiple reasons.  
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First, information regarding the tenants of REIT owned properties, as well as information about 
the financial performance of those tenants, is frequently available to the public on a timely basis.  
For example, the SNL financial data base reports the top tenants for each REIT in its coverage 
universe, including detailed information on the geographic scope and exposure of each tenant.  In 
addition, this public information is typically very transparent, and relatively easy to access.  
Additionally, the economic link between REITs and their tenants is traditionally contractual in 
nature, with REIT income derived from tenant rent collection.  As such, the economic link between 
tenant and REIT performance should be readily apparent, with new information along this 
dimension likely serving as a critical and value-relevant dimension of a REIT’s market valuation.  
Finally, as outlined by Capozza and Lee (1995), REITs may well be valued with much greater 
certainty than their Non-REIT counterparts within real estate markets, as the securitized nature of 
their equity shares facilitates enhanced liquidity, which should in turn improve the efficiency of 
the price discovery process. 
All of the attributes discussed above suggest the potential influence of limited investor 
attention on firm valuation should be less pronounced within publicly traded REIT markets.  As 
such, I contend that to the extent investors fully consider key economic linkages, the market prices 
of REITs will quickly and correspondingly respond to positive or negative performance shocks to 
their core tenants. On the other hand, if investors ignore these potentially important and transparent 
relations, REIT stock prices will evidence a lagged adjustment, as profitability fundamentals are 
only slowly recognized and incorporated into realized cash flows.  In other words, given limited 
investor attention, the market prices of REITs will be predictable based upon the previous returns 
of their core tenants.  Previewing my focal empirical results, I find the financial (return) 
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performance of commercial property tenants strongly predicts the future returns of the REITs 
which own their facilities (i.e., their landlords).  More specifically, the monthly strategy of buying 
REITs whose tenants had the most positive returns (top tercile) in the previous month, and selling 
short REITs whose tenants had the most negative returns (bottom tercile), yields abnormal returns 
of approximately 0.40 - 0.50% per month, or 5% to 6% per year. I refer to this return predictability 
as “tenant momentum,” and view my results as strong evidence that information transmission 
regarding the REIT-Tenant relation is only slowly recognized by investors.  As such, I conclude 
REIT markets may well be characterized by issues related to limited investor attention. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the existing 
literature to provide insight into the predictions and valuation implications of the limited investor 
attention hypothesis, and further explores why these issues may be of central importance to REIT 
investors.  Section III describes the data and methodological approaches employed throughout my 
empirical analyses to examine these potential relations, while Section IV presents my main 
empirical results with respect to the return predictability of tenant returns.  Section V explores the 
robustness of these relations, and presents the results of a number of tests examining variation in 
return predictability across alternative dimensions of investor inattention.  Finally, Section VI 
concludes the paper with a summary of my key findings, along with a discussion of their 
implications. 
2. Previous Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Traditional asset pricing models typically assume information is instantaneously 
incorporated into market prices when it becomes available.  The validity of this assumption 
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requires that investors both allocate sufficient attention to the asset, and further, that they consider 
all available information within the marketplace.  In reality, attention is a scarce cognitive resource 
(Kahneman 1973), and thus, investors have limited attention (Da et al. 2011).   
To elaborate, the Limited Attention Hypothesis (LAH) is based on the assumption that 
investors face both time and processing constraints, which limit their ability to monitor and process 
multiple types and/or sources of information at any one time.  As a result, investors are generally 
forced to focus on only a subset of available information regarding the firms in which they invest.  
For example, if an individual focuses on understanding the implications of the financial report of 
one firm, they may be unable to simultaneously and effectively analyze and assess more complex 
or nuanced information regarding the non-financial disclosures by that same firm.  Alternatively, 
this focus may lead them to miss important, value-relevant changes in the firm’s competitive 
market dynamics, such as the financial performance and/or operating position of its peers.1 
To the extent inattentive investors fail to accurately and efficiently incorporate all value 
relevant information into security prices, return predictability may be observed.  Consistent with 
this notion, Peng et al. (2006) find significant evidence of asset return predictability in the presence 
of investor inattention, and further, argue such return predictability increases with investor 
overconfidence.  In related work, Huang and Liu (2007) develop a theoretical model showing 
rational inattention alters the optimal trading strategy, resulting in potential (under-) over-
                                                            
1 An emerging literature finds evidence of such investor under reaction to firm specific information, including 
information regarding related firms.  Of note, Ramnath (2002) is among the first to empirically examine such issues, 
and finds evidence consistent with investor under reaction to the performance of peer firms within the same 
industry. 
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investment.  Additionally, they demonstrate investors with higher levels of risk aversion, and those 
with a longer investment horizon, may rationally choose less frequent but more accurate periodic 
news acquisition.  Conversely, exploring this same paradigm, Thomas and Zhang (2008) examine 
how the stock price of a late announcing firm is affected by the early announcements of its peers.  
Consistent with an overreaction to these early announcements, the authors find a strong negative 
correlation between the two prices. 
The investor limited attention hypothesis has also been offered as one potential explanation 
for post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD).  For example, Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) find 
Friday earnings announcements are characterized by both lower trading volume and more drift.  
Similarly, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) examine investor attention when there are multiple earnings 
announcements on the same day, and find the reaction to earnings news is significantly less 
sensitive on high-news days than on low-news days.  More formally, Hirshleifer et al. (2011) 
extend this line of reasoning and develop a model showing that both the average price reaction to 
an earnings surprise, and the average post-earnings announcement drift, increase along with the 
magnitude of the earnings surprise.  They also document that the percentage of inattentive 
investors is inversely related to the market’s immediate reaction to a given earnings surprise, and 
directly related to both the degree of misvaluation and the level of post-earnings announcement 
drift.  Taken together, the results of these prior studies suggest investor limited attention exerts a 
potentially meaningful influence over observable market outcomes. 
With respect to the current investigation, I extend this emerging literature (Cohen and 
Frazini, 2008, etc.) on firms that are economically linked, and contribute to this fast growing body 
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of literature by critically examining the relation between landlords (e.g., REITs) and the tenants 
who lease their investment properties.  As a group, real estate investment trusts generate the bulk 
of their revenue by owning and/or operating real estate properties.  For example, retail REITs 
typically earn revenue by leasing their properties to retail tenants.  Alternatively, they may also 
operate retail centers owned by third parties.  Under such an arrangement, the REIT generally 
receives a percentage of the center's revenues, called a "management fee," in exchange for their 
services.2  Because they lease space to retailers, retail REITs are particularly sensitive to U.S. 
Economic Cycles.  In general, retailers struggle during economic down turns, thus decreasing the 
demand for retail property space during such times.  This issue was brought into sharp relief as the 
U.S. economy began to slump in 2008.  During that year, a number of mid-size retail chains 
including Sharper Image (SHRP), Linen's and Things, and the furniture store Levitz all declared 
bankruptcy.  Similarly, Foot Locker (FL), Zales (ZLC), and Ann Taylor all announced over 100 
store closings, while even off-price retailers such as T.J. Maxx experienced slower sales. Store 
closures and tenant bankruptcies lower the demand for retail properties, increase vacancy rates, 
and decrease rent collections.  In the aftermath of these events, Liu and Liu (2013) examined the 
economic link between landlords and tenants by focusing on the stock market responses of REITs 
to bankruptcy announcements by their major tenants.  More specifically, they examined 157 major 
tenant bankruptcy announcements of retail real estate firms over the period 2000-2010.  Consistent 
with a growth option hypothesis, they found that during good economic times, tenant bankruptcy 
has a less negative (or more positive) effect on a landlord's stock return.  Intuitively, during robust 
                                                            
2 Retail leases often contain percentage rent clauses designed to align the interests and incentives of landlords with 
those of their tenants.  Such clauses, as with management fees based upon center revenue, further strengthen and 
underscore the economic relations between REIT landlords and their tenants. 
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economic periods replacement tenants should be easier to find.  To the extent market lease rates 
have been increasing, replacing a bankrupt tenant may even increase expected firm revenues if it 
enables the landlord to exit a below market rate contract and effectively mark the replacement rent 
back to current market levels.  Furthermore, they also find owners of properties located in markets 
with a highly diversified economic base are more likely to exercise the growth option given a 
tenant departure, and thus realize higher stock returns.  Throughout the current paper, Iexpand the 
unit of analysis to examine the financial return performance of the broad cross-section of 
commercial real estate tenants and the resulting impact on the stock returns of their (REIT) 
landlords, not simply those who have filed for bankruptcy protection. 
While financial distress may serve as a stark reminder and clear example of how firms are 
economically linked, I believe the investor limited attention hypothesis (LAH) has widespread, 
generalizable implications that my broader sample is more appropriately designed to identify and 
capture.  More specifically, it is against this backdrop that I explore the valuation implications and 
return predictability of the investor limited attention hypothesis within REIT markets, and more 
specifically investigate the potential for under reaction to firm specific news.  To the best of my 
knowledge, the current manuscript represents the first effort to systematically and rigorously 
explore the issue of investors’ limited attention within the context of real estate, and more 
specifically REIT, markets.  While Price et al. (2010) examine post earnings announcement drift 
(PEAD) in REITs, they rely on information uncertainty as their primary motivation for the 
existence and persistence of drift.  As such, ex-ante they predict the transparency of REIT assets 
should result in reduced PEAD for REITs relative to that found for Non-REIT industrial firms.  
Interestingly, their empirical results find an economically significant drift of nearly 20% (on an 
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annualized basis) for their sample of REITs, which is significantly larger than the 12% (again, on 
an annualized basis) they find for their Non-REIT observations. 
Bridging back to the central theory, when investors process one type of information 
regarding a set of REITs, it may well be difficult for them to simultaneously consider all other 
information related to those same firms.  For example, to the extent REIT analysts and investors 
are focused on current period profitability, changes in FFO, pending acquisitions/divestitures, 
corporate governance issues, or any other firm specific attribute of the REIT, value relevant 
information regarding the performance of their tenants may well be overlooked, ignored, or not 
fully incorporated into either valuation models or investment decision making.  When investors 
are subject to such attention constraints, the stock prices of the firms in which they invest will 
likely fail to fully and immediately incorporate news about related firms.  As a consequence, such 
limited attention is likely to generate price drift.  In other words, a portfolio strategy of taking a 
long position in REITs with good performing tenants, and a short position in those REITs with 
poor performing tenants, should yield positive subsequent returns.  On the other hand, because the 
economic linkages between REITs and their tenants would appear to be uniquely transparent, ex-
ante we might also expect investors to be more attentive when investing in REITs than would be 
the case for non-REIT real estate and/or industrial firms.  As such, the exact relation between the 
return performance of REITs and their core tenants remains an open empirical question. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
Given the above discussion, I begin the empirical analysis by constructing a sample of 
firms with clearly defined economic linkages and relations.  First, I identify all publicly traded 
equity REITs with return information available through the CRSP/Ziman database at any point 
over the 2000-2013 sample interval.  As the focus of this investigation is on inter-firm economic 
linkages, those REITs specializing in mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and residential real 
estate are then excluded.  I next map these potential observations on to tenant rolls provided by 
SNL Financial, and finally determine whether each of these tenants is publicly traded with return 
information available through CRSP.  I also note firms specializing in healthcare, industrial/office, 
and/or retail property investments tend to have more easily and readily identifiable tenants.  For 
example, nearly half of all firms across these three property type sectors serve as landlords for 
publicly traded tenants, compared to less than one-quarter of REITs focused on investments in 
other property type holdings.  Additional insight into the distributional characteristics of these 
sample firms across time is provided in Table 1.  Of note, the first column reports the total number 
of CRSP/Ziman equity REITs specializing in any property type other than mortgages, mortgage-
backed securities, or residential real estate, by year.  Continuing, as the focus of the current 
investigation centers broadly on the return performance of economically linked firms, and more 
specifically on the landlord-tenant relationship, I next search the SNL Financial database to 
identify the core tenants for each sample REIT.  I successfully identify tenants for 104 (40.6%) of 
my sample organizations, and report the distribution of those firms with available tenant rolls by 
sample year in column two. 
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As not all of the tenants identified by SNL are publicly traded organizations, I next 
determine whether each tenant is both publicly traded and has return information available in the 
CRSP database.  Complicating this process, naming conventions are not consistent across the two 
data platforms, leading to a number of instances for which a single tenant exhibits multiple names.  
Similarly, names reported by SNL may also vary either across REITs, or over time.3  To enhance 
the accuracy and consistency of my results, I use a phonetic string matching algorithm to generate 
a list of potential matches for each tenant name, and then hand-match tenants to the corresponding 
CRSP Permno by inspecting both the firm’s name and industry information.  To ensure tenants are 
matched to the appropriate stock returns and financial information, I am deliberately conservative 
in assigning tenant names and firm identifiers.  Tenants for which I could not identify a unique 
match are excluded from the sample.  This sorting and identification process eliminated an 
additional eight REITs for which I could not find adequate information regarding publicly traded 
tenants, leaving us with a final estimation sample of 96 unique REITs (11 Healthcare, 32 
Industrial/Office, 30 Retail, and 23 Other) with non-missing CRSP tenants.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the number of REITs in each property type category across each step of my sample construction. 
Continuing, column III in Panel A of Table 1 shows the yearly number of Ziman REITs 
with publicly traded tenants, while Panel B reports descriptive statistics regarding the distribution 
of sample firm tenants found in both CRSP and SNL.  In general, sample REITs lease their 
properties to a few dozen tenants, of which roughly half are publicly traded.  I am careful not to 
draw definitive conclusions from these distributional patterns, as I also note the sample firms 
                                                            
3 For example, the moniker J.C. Penney's and JCP are both used to identify the same retail tenant by alternative 
sample landlords/REITs. 
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exhibit considerable variation along these dimensions.  Therefore, it is quite possible the economic 
linkages between tenants and landlords may vary markedly depending upon both the number of 
tenants and the geographic dispersion of the tenant base. 
After identifying the 96 REITs for which I can assemble publicly traded tenant rolls, I next 
collect monthly returns data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  To 
augment these return characteristics, I also collect financial statement data and additional firm 
operating characteristics from both the COMPUSTAT and SNL financial databases.  After 
integrating these data sources, my final estimation sample of 96 firms includes 10,272 distinct 
firm-month observations, representing 1,398 unique REIT–Tenant relationships, over the interval 
2000 through 2013. 
Table 2 provides basic summary statistics regarding the characteristics of both sample 
REITs and their tenants.  Panel A describes the length of the relationship between each REIT and 
its tenants.  On average, the typical REIT in my sample is linked to its tenants for approximately 
4 years.  Under this initial framework, consistent with the length of the sample period, the 
maximum number of years a REIT is linked to its tenants is 14 years.  As a number of economic 
relations predate the beginning of the sample period, I also provide two additional tenure metrics.  
First, examining only those relations which were nearly formed during the evaluation window, 
similar to the previously reported numbers I find my focal landlord-tenant links persist for 
approximately three (median) to five (average = 4.73) years.  Second, extending this paradigm by 
assuming all economic relations which were in place at the beginning of the sample interval had 
been ongoing for this average 5 year cycle, I may estimate a tenure metric that is less susceptible 
12 
 
to downward bias from sample truncation.  Doing so raises the average tenure length of these 
“imputed” REIT-tenant economic linkages to slightly over 7 ½ years. 
Continuing, Panel B provides basic descriptive information regard the operating 
characteristics and attributes of both the sample REITs and their primary tenants.  Across this 
panel, all figures represent pooled firm-quarter observations, and show distributional 
characteristics for sample firms and their tenants including asset size, book-to-market ratios, 
profitability, and institutional ownership levels.  Consistent with previous investigations of REIT 
markets during this period, the average REIT across the sample is characterized by total assets of 
slightly more than $3 billion.  Their typical tenants are much larger in size. Not surprisingly, given 
regulatory distribution requirements, sample REIT book-to-market ratios hover near one.   
Notably, these requirements mandate REITs distribute at least 90% of their taxable income each 
year in order to retain their tax transparency.  As such, these regulations serve to effectively limit 
the ability of firms within this industry to endogenously fund growth and expansion activities 
through retained profits, and thereby minimize deviations between firm book and market values.  
Consistent with this notion of regulatory constraint, tenant book-to-market ratios are significantly 
lower (and exhibit considerably higher variation) than those observed for their REIT landlords, 
reflecting (in part) the enhanced growth opportunities available to these firms.  Turning to the 
profitability metrics, over the 2000-2013 time period, sample REITs generate on average higher 
accounting profits than their tenants.  Given the vast array of industries within which REIT tenants 
operate, I make few judgements along this dimension other than to note (with some surprise) the 
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average ROA exhibited by tenants of sample firms is actually close to zero.4  Finally, data on 
institutional ownership are drawn from SEC form 13(f) filings, and reveal sample REITs exhibit 
average institutional ownership of 67.11%.  Consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Ling and 
Ryngaert 1997; Su et al. 1998; and Ciochetti et al. 2002), my sample characteristics confirm both 
relatively high current levels of institutional ownership of REITs (67.11% for REITs vs. 61.88% 
for their tenants), and a strong trend toward increased institutional ownership of REITs over time.5 
3.2. Methodology 
To test my main hypothesis, I evaluate the profitability of a long–short portfolio strategy 
in which REITs with good performing tenants are purchased (longed), and REITs with poor 
performing tenants are (sold) shorted.  I identify and label this portfolio as the “tenant momentum” 
portfolio.6  Further, to ensure my results are not driven by either a single tenant’s performance, or 
my inability to capture the performance of those tenants which are not publicly traded, I focus the 
analysis on firms with a minimum of three identifiable, publicly traded tenants.7   
                                                            
4 I acknowledge that within REIT markets, (adjusted) funds from operations (FFO) typically serves as the primary 
profitability metric employed by analysts.  As REIT tenants are drawn from a much broader cross section of industries, 
many of which do not focus on FFO measures, to facilitate comparisons across tenants and landlords our  reported 
results employ the more traditional return on assets (ROA = Net Income divided by Total Assets) metric to assess 
profitability.  Not surprisingly, given the relatively high degree of correlation across these metrics for sample firms, 
our results are robust to the use of either metric. 
5 Institutional ownership levels for REITs at the beginning of our sample interval in 2000 average only 41.62%, but 
grew to 70.92% by 2013.  On the other hand, institutional ownership levels for sample tenants grew from 40.10% in 
2000 to 68.45% by the end of our sample observation window in 2013. 
6 As the vast majority of REITs within our sample have more than one tenant, to measure the recent performance of 
their collective tenants I construct an equally / value weighted portfolio of their corresponding tenants and measure 
the performance of this aggregated tenant portfolio.  Thus, within the context of the empirical results, unless otherwise 
noted, tenant performance refers to the aggregate performance of these conservatively defined tenant portfolios. 
7 Relaxation of this constraint leads to qualitatively similar empirical conclusions.  See the Appendix for comparative 
results. 
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To construct my comparison portfolios, at the beginning of each month I rank all REITs in 
ascending order according to the abnormal returns of their tenants during the previous month.8  
After ranking each REIT, I next assign them to one of three tercile portfolios.  All REITs are equal 
(value) weighted within a given portfolio.  The bottom portfolio contains all the REITs with the 
worst performing tenants in the previous month, while the top portfolio contains all the REITs 
with the best performing tenants in the previous month.  My focal hypothesis predicts that the 
alpha generated by a zero-cost portfolio that holds the top tercile of (i.e., high tenant return) REITs, 
and sells short the bottom tercile of (i.e., low tenant return) REITs, will be zero.  In other words, 
in an efficient market characterized by attentive investors, this trading rule should not generate 
abnormal returns.  Conversely, the alternative hypothesis of limited investor attention predicts a 
significant positive alpha for the proffered long-short strategy.9  Thus, under the investor limited 
attention hypothesis, positive (negative) abnormal returns following positive (negative) tenant 
returns indicate the presence of tenant momentum, consistent with a slow response of REIT prices 
to tenant news innovations. 
4. Results 
Table 3 presents the cornerstone results of my empirical analysis.  Across the table, I report 
monthly returns on portfolios of REITs formed by sorting based upon their tenants’ previous 
monthly returns.  More specifically, at the beginning of every calendar month, REITs are ranked 
                                                            
8 SNL does not report the exact lease date between a REIT and each tenant.  For both simplicity and tractability, I 
assume the link begins at the end of the year in which it is first reported.  This overly conservative identification 
scheme reduces the power of our tests, but should enhance the validity of any relations I document. 
9 In operationalizing these metrics, I calculate abnormal returns using a time-series regression of the portfolio excess 
returns on traded factors in calendar time. 
15 
 
in ascending order on the basis of the returns to portfolios of their principal tenants at the end of 
the previous month.  As noted above, only REITs with more than two publicly traded and 
identifiable tenants are included in this stage of the analysis.  After ranking, each REIT is then 
assigned to its appropriate performance-based tercile, with tercile one (T1) encompassing REITs 
with the lowest performing tenants in the previous month.  Terciles two (T2) and three (T3) are 
comprised of the middle and highest performing tenant portfolios, respectively.  Across Table 3, 
panel A (Panel B), REITs are equally (value) weighted within each tercile portfolio. 
Categorizing sample REITs according to the lagged returns of their tenants (i.e., related 
firms) allows us to readily observe and compare differences in the subsequent returns across tercile 
holdings.  Examining the results in Table 3, I find that high (low) tenant returns are associated with 
high (low) subsequent stock returns for their related REITs.  A basic/naïve “tenant momentum” 
strategy that is short the first tercile (i.e., low tenant return) REITs and long the third tercile (i.e., 
high tenant return) REITs delivers an excess return of 0.46% (t = 2.07) per month.  After 
controlling for market risk, the aforementioned tenant momentum strategy generates results that 
are both economically and statistically significant, and remain very close in magnitude to the 
results derived under the naive model framework (0.44% per month, t = 2.01).  Next, I expand the 
modelling approach to incorporate both the three factors proposed by Fama and French (1993), as 
well as the 1-year momentum factor presented in Carhart (1997).10  Under this scenario, the ex-
post performance of my sample REITs may be evaluated as follows: 
                                                            
10 Consistent with the previous literature, to minimize the influence of short-term return reversals our 1-year 
momentum factor is measured using months t-12 through t-2. 
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(𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (1.1) 
where (𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) is the month t excess return on the tercile j portfolio.  𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹 is the excess 
return of the market, while the factors SMB, HML, and MOM may be thought of as zero-
investment portfolios based on size, book-to-market, and 1-year momentum in returns.  The results 
in the third row of Panel A demonstrate that my focal tenant momentum strategy, which is short 
the first tercile (low tenant return) REITs and long the third tercile (high tenant return) REITs, 
delivers abnormal returns of 0.45% per month, or approximately 5.40% per year.  As such, 
adjusting returns to control for the REIT’s own price momentum, size, and relative value does not 
appear to exert a material impact on the previously reported results. 
Finally, in order to examine whether relative valuation differences across alternative asset 
classes materially influence the results, I next replicate the previous analysis incorporating a real 
estate factor directly into the estimation of abnormal returns.  Specifically, following the expanded 
model framework approach of Chen et al. (2012), five-factor alphas are estimated from the 
following model:  
(𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹 𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡            (1.2) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹 is the excess return on a value-weighted REIT index (constructed from all publicly 
traded REITs).  The results from this analysis are presented in the last segment of Panel A.  Once 
again, even after controlling for the possibility of a priced Real Estate Risk Factor (RERF), I 
observe positive and significant returns accruing to my focal tenant momentum strategy.  
Interestingly, my estimated return premiums remain remarkably consistent across all model 
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specifications, with alpha varying by no more than 4 basis points and all estimates attaining 
statistical significance at conventionally accepted levels. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of a parallel analysis in which all REITs within a 
given portfolio are value weighted.  The results from a naïve tenant momentum strategy are 
reported in the first row, and show excess returns of 0.52% per month, or 6.24% per year.  In the 
second row, after controlling for market risk, my focal result is virtually unchanged with excess 
market adjusted returns estimated at 0.51% per month, or 6.12% per year.  Continuing, the results 
in row three of panel B reveal a tenant momentum strategy that is short the first tercile of (low 
tenant return) REITs and long the third tercile of (high tenant return) REITs delivers abnormal 
returns of 0.53% per month, or 6.36% per year, even after controlling for the influences of both 
Fama and French’s (1993) three-factors and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.  Next, after 
controlling for the possibility of a priced Real Estate Risk Factor (RERF), abnormal returns 
accruing to my tenant momentum strategy equal 0.50% per month, or 6.00% per year.  Once again, 
these estimated return premiums remain both economically and statistically consistent across 
alternative pricing models, varying by no more than 3 basis points and attaining statistical 
significance across each alternative specification.11  Lastly, we note that estimated alphas rise 
monotonically across tercile portfolios, with higher alphas generated on portfolios of REITs 
characterized by better performing tenants.  This return pattern holds across all four model 
                                                            
11 Interestingly, and in direct contrast to Cohen and Frazzini's (2008) results, premiums accruing to the$2 billion 
tenant momentum strategy appear to be driven largely by the relatively slow diffusion of positive news rather than 
short side returns.  While a complete analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of the current investigation, 
one potential explanation for this differential finding flows directly from the relative transparency of REIT assets.  
More explicitly, Blau et al. (2009) suggest the increased transparency of REIT assets, and by extension REIT 
markets, reduces the ability of short sellers to predict negative future returns within this market sector. 
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specifications (i.e., excess returns, one-factor alpha, four-factor alpha, and five-factor alpha), and 
is consistently observed across both the equally weighted (Panel A) and value weighted (Panel B) 
portfolio returns. 
5. Robustness Tests 
5.1. Effect of Market Capitalization and Institutional Ownership 
A number of existing papers (e.g, Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Hou and Moskowitz, 2005) 
find larger firms exhibit return patterns which lead those of smaller firms, while firms 
characterized by higher levels of institutional ownership exhibit return patterns which tend to lead 
those of their counterparts with lower levels of institutional ownership.  To ensure such lead-lag 
effects are not driving the return predictability I observe amongst REITs and their tenants, I next 
estimate value-weighted tenant momentum returns generated exclusively from portfolios in which 
sample REITs are larger (smaller) than their tenants, and from portfolios in which sample REITs 
exhibit higher (lower) institutional ownership than their tenants.  Not surprisingly, given this 
estimation procedure we lose nearly half of monthly observations when analyzing subsamples 
where these filters are applied.  The results, presented in Table 4, suggest tenant momentum return 
predictability is economically larger when I consider only those economic linkages where REITs 
are larger, or exhibit higher institutional ownership levels, than their tenants.  More specifically, 
the alpha generated from the long-short momentum strategy implemented using the five factor 
model estimated exclusively on high institutional ownership (i.e., REIT I/O > tenant I/O) 
subsample equals 0.57% per month (t = 2.34), or 6.84% per year.  Similarly, alpha generated from 
my tenant momentum strategy and five factor model estimated exclusively on the large firm (i.e., 
REIT size > tenant size) subsample equals 0.43% per month (t = 1.65), or 5.16% per year.  As my 
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focal results remain both economically and statistically meaningful within these restricted 
subsamples of market leading firms, I conclude lead-lag dependency effects are unlikely to account 
for the observed return predictability I document.  For completeness, I also estimate alphas for 
subsamples of both smaller firms, and those characterized by relatively limited institutional 
ownership.  Interestingly, my tenant momentum results are not observable for these subsamples.  
As will be expounded upon more fully in the following section, these findings are entirely 
consistent with predictions from the investors' limited attention hypothesis (LAH).  
5.2. Variation in Inattention 
If limited investor attention is driving the return predictability I document above, it stands 
to reason that the magnitude and significance of my results should vary systematically with both 
the level of investor attention, and the ease with which investors may gain insight into the firm’s 
operations.  Thus, as my next robustness test I conduct a further examination of the level of 
institutional ownership for both sample firms and their tenants.  Institutional investors are one of 
the most important investor groups in the United States, and currently own or control more than 
half of all publicly traded equity in the United States.  A broad literature exists exploring the 
implications of those holdings, with numerous studies documenting important economic linkages 
between institutional ownership levels and stock returns.  For example, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) 
find a strong positive correlation between institutional ownership changes and firm level stock 
returns, while Gompers and Metrick (2001) provide evidence that the level of institutional 
ownership can forecast future stock returns.  Similarly, Menzly and Ozbas (2010) find that the 
extent of the cross-predictability in returns between customers and suppliers is negatively related 
to the level of institutional ownership.  Together, these findings suggest institutional investors 
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possess, or gain access to, value relevant company information not widely available to alternative 
market participants. 
Additionally, institutional investors may also play an important monitoring role within 
many organizations.  For example, institutional investors may exert moral suasion or threaten to 
divest their shares in direct attempts to influence management activities and/or decision making 
with respect to both individual project undertakings or broad-based company strategy and 
initiatives.  Consistent with this paradigm, a number of papers argue that large shareholders 
(including institutional investors) have direct financial incentives to monitor company (and 
management) actions, and thus play an important role in monitoring or controlling activities which 
may eliminate or reduce agency problems.12  Evidence on the efficacy of such monitoring is 
provided by Kaplan and Minton (1994), who find evidence that the involvement of large 
shareholders increases management turnover; Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), who find 
institutional investors monitor manager’s executive compensation; Kahn and Winton (1998), who 
document institutional investors intervene when there is a benefit of increasing the value of their 
stake in the firm; and Noe (2002), who finds institutional investors can prevent managers from 
engaging in opportunism.   
With respect to the current investigation, these findings suggest increased institutional 
ownership should be correlated with higher levels of investor attention through this monitoring 
channel.  As a consequence, we would anticipate the pricing efficiency of REITs to be directly 
related to institutional ownership levels, while return predictability across related firms and the 
                                                            
12 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Huddart (1993), and Maug (1998). 
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profitability of tenant momentum strategy should both decline with increases in institutional 
ownership.  To explore this possibility, I estimate the following pooled regression: 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 (1.3) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1 is the raw return on REIT i in month t+1; 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the raw return across REIT 
i’s portfolio of tenants during month t; 𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable that assumes the value of 
one if REIT i’s institutional ownership is higher than the sample wide REIT median institutional 
ownership level at time t, and zero otherwise.  Similarly, 𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable that 
assumes the value of one if REIT i’s tenant portfolio exhibits institutional ownership levels greater 
than the sample median, and zero otherwise.  Control variables include firm size (measured as the 
natural log of total assets) and book-to-market value ratios of both sample REITs and their tenant 
portfolios.  Ex-ante, to the extent increased investor attention (as measured by increased levels of 
institutional ownership) reduces return predictability, we would expect 𝛽2 to be negative.  
Similarly, to the extent tenants with higher institutional ownership attract increased investor 
attention, and furthermore, that such increased attention engenders positive attention spillover 
effects with respect to related firms (e.g., their REIT landlords), I would also expect 𝛽3 to be 
negative.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5.  Examining the results, Model 1 reports 
the univariate relation between REIT returns and their tenants’ prior performance.  Consistent with 
my previous analysis that employed a portfolio sorting approach, these findings again document a 
significant positive relation (β = 0.091, t = 18.27) between the returns of related firms.  Given the 
assumed lead-lag structure, these results also provide evidence of return predictability, and 
specifically provide further support for the profitability of a tenant momentum trading strategy.  
Model 2 expands my initial specification to include an interaction term between tenant returns and 
22 
 
the indicator variable for REITs characterized by above median levels of institutional ownership.  
In addition, I control for both firm size and book-to-market ratios, two characteristics of REITs 
that could easily influence their return performance.  Examining Model 2 results, the significant 
negative coefficient on the interaction term between past tenant returns and above average REIT 
institutional ownership levels is entirely consistent with predictions, and supports the notion that 
increased investor attention reduces both the return predictability across related firms and the 
profitability of my  tenant momentum investment strategy.  Model 3 further expands my 
specification to include an interaction term between previous tenant returns and tenant institutional 
ownership levels, as well as additional controls for both the size and book-to-market ratios of REIT 
tenants.  In contrast to what was expected, the tenant institutional ownership interaction term does 
not exhibit a significantly negative coefficient. Finally, taking a slightly different econometric 
approach, Model 4 presents the results from the estimating equation when I cluster standard errors 
by firm (REIT), while Model 5 presents the results when I cluster standard errors by both firm 
(REIT) and year.  Across each of these expanded model specifications, the results continue to 
support the conclusion that return predictability declines in the presence of higher institutional 
ownership (i.e., investor attention) levels for either the REIT or its core tenants, while interactive 
effects provide mixed results. 
Along this same dimension, in a second robustness test I attempt to identify a subset of 
firms for which attention constraints are likely to be uniquely pronounced, and then examine 
whether return predictability is more (less) severe for those organizations.  Following Cohen and 
Frazzini (2008), I posit that the potential for the simultaneous collection of information reduces 
information acquisition costs across REIT-tenant pairs exhibiting common institutional ownership.  
23 
 
Thus, consistent with the limited attention hypothesis, ex-ante we would anticipate firms (i.e., 
REITs/landlords) characterized by increased levels of common institutional ownership with their 
tenants should exhibit enhanced informational transparency and, as a direct consequence, reduced 
return predictability.  
To examine this hypothesis, as outlined above, I collect data on the institutional holdings 
of both the sample REITs and their tenants from SEC form 13(f) filings.  Operationally, I then 
compute common ownership (COMMON) as the number of institutions holding equity positions 
in both the tenant and the REIT (JOINT) divided by the total number of institutions holding equity 
positions in the REIT only over the same month (#TOTAL).  I next divide the sample into 
equivalent size High and Low COMMON ownership groupings using a median split, and then 
reevaluate the profitability of the aforementioned tenant momentum strategy across these 
alternative attention based portfolios.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.  
Consistent with focal investors' limited attention hypothesis, examining these results I find strong 
evidence that common ownership directly impacts the information environment of sample firms.  
Of note, the previously documented return predictability appears to be both uniquely pronounced, 
and concentrated exclusively, within those organizations exhibiting relatively low COMMON 
institutional ownership levels.  More specifically, while no evidence of return predictability is 
found amongst High COMMON institutional ownership grouping, the results across the low 
information subset are both strongly significant and evidence enhanced economic significance 
relative to the base case results presented in Table 3.  Together, these results provide strong, 
supporting evidence regarding the role and importance of investor limited attention to the 
efficiency of asset pricing within the marketplace. 
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5.3. Property Type Specialization – The Case of Retail REITs 
As the ease and level of information acquisition by investors may vary markedly along 
with the opacity of a firm's underlying assets and operations, I next explore potential differences 
in return predictability across property type classifications.  More specifically, given the relatively 
high engagement factor between REIT investors and their corresponding retail tenants, I believe it 
is entirely possible that investors in retail REITs may pay more attention to the economic linkages 
between landlords and their retail tenants than would be found in other property type sectors.  For 
example, high vacancy rates or low foot traffic at a regional mall may be readily observable by 
even a casual investor on an informal shopping trip, while corresponding signs of weakness for 
industrial, office, and/or healthcare properties may be less noticeable and only fully revealed with 
a lag when periodic firm disclosures are made public.  Therefore, to the extent retail REIT investors 
are characterized by greater attention to the economic performance of related firms/tenants, we 
would expect retail REITs to exhibit lower return predictability than REITs specializing in other 
property type categories.  To explore this possibility, I divide the sample into Retail versus Non-
Retail REITs, and directly examine the return predictability and profitability of my tenant 
momentum trading strategy across these two subsamples.  As illustrated in Figure 1, 31% (30 of 
96) of my sample firms are classified as Retail REITs, with the remaining 69% (66 of 96) classified 
as Non-Retail.  The results of these subsample analyses are reported in Table 7.  Once again, 
consistent with focal investors’ limited attention hypothesis, I find return predictability and the 
profitability of the long-short tenant momentum strategy is confined to the Non-Retail REIT 
subsample.  
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5.4 Additional Considerations 
5.4.1 Alternative Portfolio Identification Strategies 
To assess the validity and consistency of my core result that information travels slowly 
across related firms, I next entertain an alternative explanation for my findings.  In implementing 
my original empirical tests, I implicitly assumed all landlord-tenant relations were fully and 
instantaneously recognized by the market.  This assumption includes not only the recognition of 
the identities of all related parties, but also any value relevant information contained within the 
lease contracts formalizing those relations and/or soft information regarding future firm 
performance which emanates from those economic linkages.  Following Cohen and Frazzini 
(2008), I next relax this assumption by imposing a 6-month gap between year-end dates and the 
stock returns I capture.  This process is designed to ensure that the REIT–Tenant relations I seek 
to evaluate are well known and transparent to all relevant market participants long before the 
returns they are used to explain.13   
Table 8 reports the results from both equally weighted and value weighted portfolios when 
this six month identification gap is considered.  Reassuringly, the results for both equally weighted 
and value weighted portfolios are qualitatively identical, both economically and statistically, to the 
results previously reported without the six month identification gap.  Of note, employing equally 
weighted portfolios, the alphas generated by my hypothesized long-short tenant momentum 
strategy under this relaxed identification scheme range from 0.36% to 0.44% per month.  For 
comparison, recall the original values ranged from 0.42% to 0.46% per month (see Table 3, Panel 
                                                            
13 This lag also mimics the standard gap imposed across the existing literature to match accounting variables to 
subsequent price and return data.  See, for example, Fama and French (1993).   
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A) when I did not impose the gap.  Similarly, our value weighted results under this alternative 
identification approach reveal returns accruing to our tenant momentum strategy range from 0.40% 
to 0.43% per month.  These returns are again quite similar to those previously reported using value 
weighted portfolios, which ranged from 0.50% to 0.53% (see Table 3, Panel B).  I also note the 
magnitude of the tenant momentum returns is once again monotonically increasing in tenant return 
terciles.  This latter result holds across all four excess return model specifications, and is robust to 
the use of both equally and value weighted portfolio formation techniques.  Taken together, these 
results strongly suggest my central findings are not driven by minor differences in the classification 
scheme utilized to identify related firms. 
5.4.2. Longer Holding Periods 
Turning to investor characteristics, from an information collection and processing 
perspective I anticipate that the longer an individual investor holds an investment stake within a 
firm, the better informed they will be regarding that organization's value drivers, and hence, the 
greater the information content they will be able to incorporate into prices.  To test this notion, I 
examine the returns to the tenant momentum strategy in the three months following the portfolio 
formation date.  Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), at the end of each month I rank the 
REITs in my sample based upon the past one-month returns of their tenants, and then group the 
REITs into three equally (value) weighted portfolios based upon these rankings.  Each portfolio is 
then held for one, two, and three months following portfolio formation (note: the one month 
holding period simply replicates my initial, base case estimation approach found in Table 3).  The 
alternative investment horizons I consider, along with their corresponding returns, are presented 
in Figure 2.  Interestingly, and consistent with the investor limited attention hypothesis, I find the 
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profitability of my focal tenant momentum strategy monotonically decreases as the investment 
horizon increases.  Similarly, in untabulated results varying both the length of the investment 
horizon and the length of the portfolio formation window (also from one to three months), I again 
find evidence supporting my core assertions.  More specifically, across all three portfolio 
formation intervals, I consistently observe monotonically decreasing returns to the tenant 
momentum strategy as the length of the investment horizon increases.  The consistency of these 
relations across alternative portfolio strategies adds further strength and support to the relevance 
and importance of investor limited attention in today's financial marketplace. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether, and to what extent, investors’ limited attention exerts a 
substantial influence on the return patterns of related firms.  More specifically, focusing on the 
uniquely transparent tenant-landlord relationship across income producing properties in 
commercial real estate markets, I test whether the equity prices of publicly traded real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) fully and instantaneously incorporate all value relevant information 
pertaining to the financial return performance of those organizations which lease their properties.  
As the REIT-tenant economic linkages I examine throughout this paper are generally readily 
observable and represent publicly available information (particularly within the health care, 
industrial/office, and retail property type sectors), to the extent the market is efficient, all such 
information should already be incorporated into currently observable stock prices.  Interestingly, 
however, the results of this investigation suggest investors fail to fully account for these links.  A 
direct consequence of this limited investor attention is return predictability, which may be 
exploited by buying (selling) REITs following a positive (negative) performance shock to their 
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tenants.  Operationalizing this construct, I find a monthly strategy of buying REITs whose tenants 
generated the highest (tercile) returns in the previous month, and selling short REITs whose tenants 
generated the lowest (tercile) returns, yields an annualized abnormal return of approximately 5-
6%.  I refer to this return predictability as “tenant momentum”.  Through an extended series of 
additional tests, I demonstrate that my core findings are consistently robust across a variety of 
holding periods, portfolio identification strategies/approaches, alternative model specifications, 
and levels of investor attention (as measured by institutional ownership levels, firm size, and 
property type focus).  In sum, the results of this investigation provide strong evidence of: 1) return 
predictability across related firms within REIT markets, 2) the profitability of a “tenant 
momentum” investment/trading strategy, and 3) the importance of investor attention to the 
efficient pricing of securities in general, and real estate related securities in particular.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Distribution of Sample Firms by Property Type Focus 
This figure shows the distribution of sample REITs by the property type focus of their primary investment property 
holdings.  The left column in each category shows the number of REITs in each category tracked by CRSP Ziman.  
The middle column in each category shows the number of REITs covered by SNL Financial.  The right most column 
in each category shows the number of SNL REITs that have publicly traded tenants listed in CRSP. 
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Ziman REITs 21 68 69 98 256
Ziman REITs with SNL Tenants 14 33 31 26 104
Ziman REITs with CRSP Tenants 11 32 30 23 96
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Figure 1.2. Alternative Holding Periods 
 
This figure shows calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns for different investment horizons.  At the beginning of 
every calendar month, REITs are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the returns to a portfolio of their principal 
tenants at the end of the previous month.  The ranked REITs are then assigned to one of three tercile portfolios.  All 
REITs are equally weighted within a given portfolio.  Alpha is the intercept from a regression of monthly excess 
returns from the rolling strategy.  The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) 
mimicking portfolios, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and a real estate factor.  The real estate factor, RERF, is 
the return in excess of a 1-month Treasury bill of a REIT index representing the universe of REITs.  The figure shows 
Buy-Sell alpha from a zero-cost portfolio that shorts the bottom 33% (lowest) tenant return stocks and longs the top 
33% (highest) tenant return stocks.  Excess returns and alphas are in monthly percentage terms.  I restrict the sample 
to REITs with at least 3 tenants.  After forming the portfolios, they are held for one, two, and three months.  The left 
column shows the results when the holding period is one month, the middle column shows the results when the holding 
period is two months, and the right column shows the results when the holding period is three months. 
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics of Matching Procedure 
This table shows descriptive statistics regarding the construction of my sample data.  Sample firm (REIT) data are 
drawn from the CRSP/Ziman and SNL Financial data bases.  The first column shows the number of equity REITs 
(excluding those with an investment focus on mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, or residential property) 
covered by CRSP/Ziman each year from 2000-2013.  Column 2 reports the number of REITs satisfying this initial 
condition which are included in the SNL Financial database.  Column 3 shows the yearly number of REITs 
satisfying these initial two conditions, which also have publicly traded tenants included in CRSP.  Note, I am 
intentionally very conservative in matching tenants reported in SNL to CRSP, and include only those firms for 
which I can ensure a 100% match.  
  
Panel A.  Sample Firms Over Time 
Year 
Number of REITs in 
CRSP/Ziman 
Number of REITs with 
SNL Tenants 
Number of REITs with 
CRSP Tenants 
2000 152 32 32 
2001 143 37 37 
2002 138 42 42 
2003 134 47 47 
2004 143 52 51 
2005 143 56 55 
2006 129 60 58 
2007 108 63 60 
2008 107 64 63 
2009 107 74 71 
2010 116 80 78 
2011 118 84 81 
2012 128 87 85 
2013 140 95 95 
Panel B.  Tenant Characteristics/Distribution 
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
Number of tenants in CRSP 16 14 10 1 48 
Number of tenants in SNL 35 32 23 2 122 
Percentage of tenants covered 41% 42% 17% 10% 100% 
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics -- Characteristics of REITs and Their Tenants   
This table shows descriptive statistics of the firms included in my final sample, as well as those of their core tenants.  
REIT data are drawn first from the CRSP/Ziman data base and then matched with coverage from the SNL Financial 
database.  Panel A shows the time series statistics of the link duration between sample REITs and their core tenants.  
Panel B provides summary statistics for the pooled firm year observations from 2000 to 2013.  Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  Book-to-market is the book value of equity (as reported by Compustat) divided by its lagged 
market value of equity.  Tenant and REIT profitability is measured as net income divided by total assets.  Institutional 
ownership data are collected from the Thomson Financial 13F Database. 
 
 
  
 
Mean Median SD 1% 99% 
 Panel B :Firms (Pooled Firm-Quarter Observations) 
REIT size ($ millions) 3,790.86 2,483.65 4,461.16 177.12 23,743.59 
Tenant size ($ millions) 60,344.85 4,439.23 238,093.21 75.16 1,856,646.00 
REIT book-to-market 0.84 0.73 0.64 0.03 4.22 
Tenant book-to-market 0.76 0.40 1.92 -0.75 14.55 
REIT Profitability: ROA=NI/TA (%) 0.57 0.59 0.91 -2.62 3.74 
Tenant Profitability: ROA=NI/TA (%) 0.01 1.01 4.85 -18.84 8.29 
REIT Institutional Ownership (%) 67.11 77.56 34.31 0.00 119.30 
Tenant Institutional Ownership (%) 61.88 70.83 33.14 0.00 116.52 
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Table 1.3. Tenant Momentum Strategy, Abnormal Returns 2000–2013    
     
This table shows calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month, REITs are 
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the return to a portfolio of their principal tenants at the end of the previous 
month.  The ranked REITs are then assigned to one of three tercile portfolios.  All REITs are equally weighted (Panel 
A) or value weighted (Panel B) within a given portfolio.  Alpha is the intercept from a regression of monthly excess 
return from the rolling strategy.  The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) 
mimicking portfolios, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and a real estate factor.  The real estate factor, RERF, is 
the return in excess of a 1-month Treasury of a REIT index representing the universe of REITs.  Buy-Sell is the alpha 
of a zero-cost portfolio that shorts the bottom 33% (lowest) tenant return stocks and holds the top 33% (highest) tenant 
return stocks.  Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.  I 
restrict my sample to the REITs with at least three publicly traded tenants with return information available through 
CRSP. 
(𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
 
 
Panel A. Equally-Weighted Returns 
 T1(Sell) T2 T3 (Buy) Buy-Sell 
Excess returns 
1.10** 
(1.97) 
 
1.29** 
(2.10) 
 
1.56** 
(2.44) 
 
0.46** 
(2.07) 
 
One-Factor Alpha 
0.60 
(1.40) 
 
0.79 
(1.61) 
 
1.04** 
(2.01) 
 
0.44** 
(2.01) 
 
Four-Factor Alpha 
0.28 
(0.76) 
 
0.47 
(1.06) 
 
0.73 
(1.59) 
 
0.45** 
(2.00) 
 
Five-Factor Alpha 
-0.14 
(-1.09) 
 
-0.03 
(-0.16) 
 
0.26 
(1.06) 
 
0.42* 
(1.80) 
 
MKT-RF 
-0.10** 
(-2.26) 
 
-0.24*** 
(-4.00) 
 
-0.24*** 
(-3.10) 
 
-0.13* 
(-1.81) 
 
SMB 
0.16** 
(2.44) 
 
0.13* 
(1.65) 
 
0.17 
(1.62) 
 
0.02 
(0.18) 
 
HML 
0.02 
(0.45) 
 
-0.05 
(-0.68) 
 
0.06 
(0.69) 
 
0.04 
(0.44) 
 
MOM 
-0.05 
(-1.58) 
 
-0.08* 
(-1.78) 
 
-0.17*** 
(-3.12) 
 
-0.12 
(-2.24) 
 
RERF 
1.14*** 
(33.51) 
 
1.31*** 
(29.61) 
 
1.28*** 
(22.21) 
 
0.12** 
(2.44) 
 
R-Squared 94.66% 92.56 % 88.27% 9.35% 
Adjusted R-Squared 94.50% 92.33% 87.91% 6.53% 
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Panel B. Value-Weighted Returns 
 T1(Sell) T2 T3 (Buy) Buy-Sell 
Excess returns 
0.87 
(1.61) 
 
1.10* 
(1.92) 
 
1.40** 
(2.40) 
 
0.52** 
(2.31) 
 
One-Factor Alpha 
0.55 
(1.30) 
 
0.76* 
(1.71) 
 
1.06** 
(2.31) 
 
0.51** 
(2.28) 
 
Four-Factor Alpha 
0.25 
(0.65) 
 
0.47 
(1.12) 
 
0.78* 
(1.85) 
 
0.53** 
(2.31) 
 
Five-Factor Alpha 
-0.19 
(-1.34) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.09) 
 
0.31* 
(1.84) 
 
0.50** 
(2.16) 
 
MKT-RF 
-0.07* 
(-1.66) 
 
-0.18*** 
(-3.77) 
 
-0.19*** 
(-3.55) 
 
-0.11 
(-1.54) 
 
SMB 
-0.06 
(-0.99) 
 
0.02 
(0.23) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
 
0.05 
(0.50) 
 
HML 
-0.05 
(-1.03) 
 
-0.15*** 
(-2.69) 
 
-0.10 
(-1.51) 
 
-0.04 
(-0.46)  
 
 
MOM 
0.04 
(1.07) 
 
0.02 
(0.69) 
 
-0.04 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.07 
(-1.31) 
 
RERF 
1.16*** 
(32.73) 
 
1.26*** 
(35.34) 
 
1.26*** 
(30.19) 
 
0.09 
(1.59) 
 
R-Squared 93.89% 94.38% 92.56% 3.45% 
Adjusted R-Squared 93.63% 94.21% 92.30% 0.4% 
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Table 1.4. Lead-Lag Effect 
This table shows calendar-time portfolio returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month, REITs are ranked in 
ascending order on the basis of the return to a portfolio of its principal tenants in the previous month.  The ranked 
REITs are then assigned to one of three tercile portfolios.  All REITs are value weighted within a given portfolio.  
This table includes all available REITs and tenants satisfying the condition on the left-hand side at portfolio formation.  
Size is the firm's total assets as extracted from Compustat.  IO is institutional ownership, defined as the total number 
of shares owned by intuitional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding.  Institutional holdings are 
from Thomson Financial.  Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly five-factor excess returns from the rolling 
strategy.  The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, the 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and a real estate factor. 
 
  Five factor Alpha  Excess Return 
Restrict 
investment to T1(Sell) T2 T3 (Buy) Buy-Sell T1(Sell) T2 T3 (Buy) Buy-Sell 
REIT IO > Tenant IO 
-0.27* 
(-1.71) 
0.15 
(0.91) 
0.30* 
(1.75) 
0.57** 
(2.34) 
0.78 
(1.32) 
1.20** 
(2.03) 
1.30** 
(2.17) 
0.52** 
(2.15) 
        
 
REIT IO < Tenant IO 
-0.26 
(-1.27) 
-0.10 
(-0.51) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
0.27 
(0.71) 
0.71 
(1.14) 
1.00 
(1.30) 
1.11 
(1.52) 
0.40 
(1.00) 
        
 
REIT Size > Tenant Size 
0.07 
(0.29) 
0.14 
(0.75) 
0.50** 
(2.25) 
0.43* 
(1.65) 
1.31* 
(1.66) 
1.40* 
(1.92) 
1.80** 
(2.31) 
0.49* 
(1.68) 
        
 
REIT Size < Tenant Size 
0.90 
(0.44) 
-0.19 
(-0.66) 
0.35 
(1.46) 
0.10 
(0.78) 
1.02* 
(1.69) 
0.95 
(1.27) 
1.16* 
(1.94) 
0.14 
(0.44) 
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Table 1.5. Effect of Institutional Ownership Levels 
This table shows results of a robustness test for REITs’ return predictability.  𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+1 is the return of REITs in month 
t+1, 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 is the return of tenants in the current month, and 𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑂 is a dummy that assumes the value of one if the 
REIT exhibits high institutional ownership (I consider the median institutional ownership as the break point), and 
equals zero if the REIT exhibits low institutional ownership.  𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑂 is also an indicator that equals one if the tenant 
has high institutional ownership, and zero if it has low institutional ownership.  Models 1, 2, and 3 control for REIT 
and year fixed effects.  Model 4 presents the results when I cluster by REIT, while Model 5 presents the results of the 
regression when I cluster by both REIT and year. 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑂 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑂 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 
 
  
Dependent Variable is the REIT’s return in the following month 
 
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Intercept 
0.013*** 
(29.26) 
0.016*** 
(3.26) 
0.017*** 
(2.99) 
0.016*** 
(3.26) 
0.016* 
(1.70) 
TRET 
0.091*** 
(18.27) 
0.101*** 
(12.98) 
0.104*** 
(11.18) 
0.104*** 
(4.40) 
0.104*** 
(4.33) 
TRET*RHIO 
 -0.022* 
(-1.70) 
-0.017* 
(-1.71) 
-0.017 
(-0.54) 
-0.017 
(-0.60) 
TRET*THIO 
 
 
-0.03 
(-0.35) 
-0.003 
(-0.25) 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
RHIO 
 -0.003*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.003 
(-1.35) 
-0.01 
(-1.18) 
THIO 
 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.05) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.38) 
REIT Size 
 0.010* 
(1.71) 
0.001* 
(1.80) 
0.001 
(0.81) 
0.001 
(0.56) 
Tenant Size 
 
 
-0.002 
(-0.93) 
-0.002 
(-0.71) 
-0.002 
(-0.49) 
REIT BM 
 -0.011*** 
(-10.11) 
-0.022*** 
(-11.87) 
-0.021*** 
(-7.01) 
-0.023*** 
(-2.72) 
Tenant BM 
 
 
-0.002*** 
(-2.46) 
-0.003*** 
(-4.17) 
-0.003 
(-1.10) 
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y N N 
REIT fixed effect Y Y Y N N 
R-Squared 0.71% 1.29% 1.34% 1.34% 1.34% 
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Table 1.6. Effect of Common Institutional Ownership  
 
This table shows results from a robustness test regarding REITs’ return predictability.  At the beginning of every 
calendar month, REITs are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the return to a portfolio of its principal tenants 
in the previous month.  The ranked REITs are assigned to one of three tercile portfolios.  All REITs are equally 
weighted within a given portfolio.  Next, REITs are further split into two groups (above and below median), based on 
COMMON Institutional Ownership.  For each firm, “common ownership” is defined as the number of institutional 
investors holding an ownership stake in both the tenant and the REIT in a given calendar month (#JOINT) divided by 
the number of institutional investors holding an ownership stake within the REIT during that same month (#TOTAL).  
I report returns to an equally weighted, zero-cost portfolio that holds the top one third of high tenant return stocks and 
sells short the bottom one third of low tenant return stocks.  Returns are in monthly percent; t-statistics are shown 
below the coefficient estimates.  
 
  Five factor Alpha  Excess Return 
Restrict 
investment to T1(Sell) T2 T3 (Buy) Buy-Sell T1(Sell) T2 T3 (Buy) Buy-Sell 
 High COMMON  
0.09 
(0.31) 
0.15 
(0.66) 
0.17 
(0.57) 
0.08 
(0.31) 
1.45** 
(2.11) 
1.49** 
(2.29) 
1.52** 
(2.18) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
         
Low COMMON 
-0.11 
(-0.59) 
0.08 
(0.5) 
0.45* 
(1.65) 
0.55** 
(2.43) 
1.15** 
(1.93) 
1.43** 
(2.35) 
1.74*** 
(2.64) 
0.58*** 
(2.64) 
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Table 1.7. Property Type Specialization – The Case of Retail REITs 
This table shows calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month, REITS are 
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the return to a portfolio of its principal tenants at the end of the previous 
month.  The ranked REITS are assigned to one of three tercile portfolios.  All REITs are value weighted within a given 
portfolio.  Alpha is the intercept from a regression of monthly five-factor excess returns from the rolling strategy.  The 
explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor, and a real estate factor.  The real estate factor, RERF, is the return in excess of a 1-month Treasury 
bill, on a REIT index representing the universe of REITs.  Buy-Sell is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that shorts the 
bottom 33% of (lowest) tenant return stocks and holds the top 33% of (highest) tenant return stocks. Returns and 
alphas are in monthly percent, while t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.  I restrict my sample to 
REITs with at least three publicly traded tenants with return information available through CRSP. 
(𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
14 In untabulated results, I also test the return predictability for different REIT types.  Industrial/office REITs generate an alpha of 
0.41% per month, which is statistically insignificant.  The alpha for Healthcare REITs is negative (-0.11%), and again 
insignificant.  Finally, the alpha for Other REITs is 0.69%, and is again statistically insignificant.  The detailed results of these 
additional tests are available directly from the authors upon request. 
 Five factor Alpha Excess Return 
Restrict to 
T1(Sell) T2 T3(Buy) Buy-Sell T1(Sell) T2 T3(Buy) Buy-Sell 
Non-Retail REITs14 
-0.36* 
(-1.86) 
-0.07 
(-0.48) 
0.22 
(1.00) 
0.58** 
(2.41) 
0.66 
(1.13) 
0.93 
(1.62) 
1.21** 
(2.09) 
0.55** 
(2.21) 
         
Retail REITs 
0.33 
(1.23) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.37 
(0.72) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
1.35** 
(2.10) 
1.24* 
(1.67) 
1.58* 
(1.75) 
0.22 
(0.46) 
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Table 1.8. Tenant Momentum Strategy, Abnormal Returns 2000–2013 (With Fama French 6 month 
gap) 
This table shows calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month, REITs are 
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the return to a portfolio of their principal tenants at the end of the previous 
month.  The ranked REITs are then assigned to one of three tercile portfolios.  All REITs are equal weighted (Panel 
A) or value weighted (Panel B) within a given portfolio.  Alpha is the intercept from a regression of monthly five-
factor excess return from the rolling strategy.  The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and 
French (1993) mimicking portfolios, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and a real estate factor.  The real estate 
factor, RERF, is the return in excess of a 1-month Treasury bill on a REIT index representing the universe of REITs.  
Buy-Sell is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that shorts the bottom 33% of (lowest) tenant return stocks and holds the 
top 33% of (highest) tenant return stocks.  Returns and alphas are reported in monthly percent, while t-statistics are 
shown below the coefficient estimates.  I restrict the sample to REITs with at least three publicly traded tenants with 
return information available through CRSP. 
(𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Panel A. Equal-Weighted Returns 
 T1(Sell) T2 T3(Buy) Buy-Sell 
Excess returns 
0.97* 
(1.76) 
 
1.17* 
(1.78) 
 
1.41** 
(2.18) 
 
0.44* 
(1.82) 
 
One-factor alpha 
0.48 
(1.14) 
 
0.66 
(1.22) 
 
0.88* 
(1.65) 
 
0.40* 
(1.67) 
 
Four-Factor Alpha 
0.30 
(0.81) 
 
0.52 
(1.06) 
 
0.72 
(1.52) 
 
0.42* 
(1.71) 
 
Five-Factor Alpha 
-0.10 
(-0.76) 
 
0.01 
(0.05) 
 
0.25 
(1.02) 
 
0.36 
(1.60) 
 
MKT-RF 
-0.09** 
(-2.08) 
 
-0.32*** 
(-4.35) 
 
-0.27*** 
(-3.26) 
 
-0.17* 
(-2.17) 
 
HML 
0.02 
(0.22) 
 
-0.12 
(-1.11) 
 
0.04 
(0.30) 
 
0.02 
(0.19) 
 
SMB 
0.15** 
(2.34) 
 
0.17* 
(1.67) 
 
0.18 
(1.52) 
 
0.02 
(0.22) 
 
MOM 
-0.04 
(-1.17) 
 
-0.17*** 
(-3.24) 
 
-0.17*** 
(-2.85) 
 
-0.14** 
(-2.26) 
 
RERF 
1.13*** 
(32.59) 
 
1.41*** 
(25.12) 
 
1.30*** 
(20.89) 
 
0.17*** 
(2.84) 
 
R-Squared 94.61% 90.26% 87.15% 10.94% 
Adjusted R-Squared 94.44 89.95 86.74 8.09% 
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Panel B. Value-Weighted Returns 
 T1(Sell) T2 T3(Buy) Buy-Sell 
Excess returns 
0.91 
(1.63) 
 
1.09* 
(1.75) 
 
1.33** 
(2.33) 
 
0.43** 
(1.97) 
 
One-Factor Alpha 
0.47 
(1.12) 
 
0.61 
(1.22) 
 
0.89** 
(1.95) 
 
0.42* 
(1.90) 
 
Four-Factor Alpha 
0.30 
(0.74) 
 
0.48 
(1.04) 
 
0.73* 
(1.70) 
 
0.45** 
(2.00) 
 
Five-Factor Alpha 
-0.13 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
 
0.27* 
(1.71) 
 
0.40* 
(1.80) 
 
MKT-RF 
-0.09* 
(-1.87) 
 
-0.15*** 
(-3.83) 
 
-0.21*** 
(-3.87) 
 
-0.13* 
(-1.70) 
 
SMB 
-0.05 
(-0.76) 
 
0.05 
(0.57) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
 
0.04 
(0.39) 
 
HML 
-0.07 
(-1.05) 
 
-0.16* 
(-1.75) 
 
-0.15* 
(-1.83) 
 
-0.08 
(-0.70) 
 
MOM 
0.06* 
(1.71) 
 
-0.12 
(-2.56) 
 
-0.02 
(-0.56) 
 
-0.08 
(-1.5) 
 
RERF 
1.16*** 
(32.06) 
 
1.34*** 
(28.45) 
 
1.28*** 
(30.00) 
 
0.12 
(2.06) 
 
R-Squared 93.83% 92.16% 92.59% 5.12% 
Adjusted R-Squared 93.64% 91.90% 92.35% 2.08% 
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Appendix 
Table 1.9. Tenant Momentum Strategy, Abnormal Returns 2000–2013 (Different Number Tenants 
per REIT) 
This table shows calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns.  At the beginning of every calendar month, REITs are 
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the return to a portfolio of their principal tenants at the end of the previous 
month.  The ranked REITs are then assigned to one of three tercile portfolios.  All REITs are equally weighted within 
a given portfolio, while Alpha is the intercept from a regression of monthly five-factor excess returns from the rolling 
strategy.  The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, the 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and a real estate factor.  The real estate factor, RERF, is the return in excess of a 1-
month Treasury bill on a REIT index representing the universe of REITs.  Returns and alphas are reported in monthly 
percentages, while t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.  In Panel A I do not restrict the sample to the 
specific number of tenants for each REIT.  In Panel B I restrict the sample to include REITs with at least two publicly 
traded tenants with return information available through CRSP. 
 
                                                            
15 *The results for alphas of value weighted portfolios range from 0.53% to 0.57% per month, with corresponding t-
statistics ranging from 2.40 to 2.60. 
Panel A. No restrictions on number of tenants per REIT 
 T1(Sell) T2 T3(Buy) Buy-Sell 
Excess returns 
1.13** 
(2.16) 
 
1.52** 
(2.53) 
 
1.53*** 
(2.64) 
 
0.38* 
(2.04) 
 
One-Factor alpha 
0.66 
(1.63) 
 
1.02** 
(2.16) 
 
1.03** 
(2.30) 
 
0.38** 
(2.02) 
 
Four-Factor Alpha 
0.34 
(0.96) 
 
0.74* 
(1.85) 
 
0.72* 
(1.80) 
 
0.38** 
(2.11) 
 
Five-Factor Alpha 
-0.06 
(-0.49) 
 
0.29 
(1.59) 
 
0.27 
(1.60) 
 
0.33* 
(1.80) 
 
Panel B. Restrict the number of tenants to be greater than 2.* 15 
 T1(Sell) T2 T3(Buy) Buy-Sell 
Excess returns 
1.11** 
(2.05) 
 
1.32** 
(2.24) 
 
1.61*** 
(2.62) 
 
0.50** 
(2.38) 
 
One-Factor alpha 
0.62 
(1.50) 
 
0.84* 
(1.76) 
 
1.10** 
(2.21) 
 
0.48** 
(2.26) 
 
Four-Factor Alpha 
0.30 
(0.84) 
 
0.53 
(1.24) 
 
0.78* 
(1.78) 
 
0.48** 
(2.25) 
 
Five-Factor Alpha 
-0.11 
(-0.89) 
 
0.05 
(0.29) 
 
0.31 
(1.43) 
 
0.42** 
(2.02) 
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ESSAY2: INFORMED SHORT SALE: EVIDENCE FROM 
ECONOMICALLY LINKED FIRMS 
1. Introduction 
Firms are economically linked to their customers and suppliers. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) 
document that firms’ value-relevant observable information is only slowly transferred though the 
supply chain.  They find that when a firm is listed as a major customer, any shock to a customer’s 
stock price should also have an effect on the firm’s future stock price, which means that there is a 
return predictability between related firms along the supply chain. The predictable large abnormal 
returns in supplier companies is due to the fact that the majority of  investors have limited attention 
about the performance of customer firms and this limited attention results in informational 
inefficiencies and hence the return predictability. Examples of other studies that investigate 
investor reaction to firms’ customer’s performance include Pandit et al. (2011), Zhu (2014), Ahern 
and Harford (2014) and Hertzel et al. (2008). Of particular importance in this setting is to study 
whether smart investors will trade based on the economic linkage between firms and whether they 
help the information flow across the supply chain. 
Recent studies examines the role of smart investors in information flow along the supply 
chain. Menzley and Ozbas (2010) find evidence that extent of return predictability in the cross 
sectional of suppliers and customers is negatively related to the level of information in the market 
that is proxied by the level of analyst coverage or by institutional ownership. Alldredge and Cicero 
(2014) show that insiders make profit by attentive trading based on the link between suppliers and 
customers. Since insiders are more attentive to their firm’s customers’ information, they are able 
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to make profit based on that information. In another paper, Alldredge and Puckett (2016) 
investigate the significance of supply-chain relationships for institutional investors. They find that 
supply-chain relationships are an important determinant of institutional ownership and institutions 
experience abnormal trading profits in supplier firms. Guan et al. (2014) find that if sell-side 
analysts cover both supplier and customer they are able to improve their earnings forecast accuracy 
of supplier firms significantly more than analysts who only cover the supplier. These studies show 
that while most investors exhibit limited attention in supply chain setting, smart investors are able 
to benefit from the information about economically linked firms. I extend this line of literature to 
consider whether short sellers are informed about the economic link between suppliers and 
customers.   
Short sellers are often viewed as informed investors who incur relatively large transaction 
costs to short-sell overpriced stocks and subsequently buy them back at a lower price in order to 
make profit. Because the potential loss associated with short selling is unlimited, they usually don’t 
take positions in stocks unless they have information about the future return of those stocks. As 
such, this paper contributes to several strands of literature in finance. First, my paper adds to the 
literature that examines the predictive power of short sellers and whether short sellers can predict 
bad news (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987, Christophe et al. 2004, Christophe et al. 2010, 
Chakrabarty and Shkilko 2008, and Karpoff and Lou 2008). My paper, therefore, addresses the 
gap in the literature by examining whether short-selling in a firm in the months leading up to the 
firm’s customer’s (supplier’s) negative shock is negatively correlated to the firm’s customer’s 
(supplier’s) future performance.  Applying Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) theory to customer 
and supplier news, I find that a firm’s short interest contains information about the future return of 
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the firm’s customers. In other tests, I find that short sellers can predict earnings news in firm’s 
supplier or customer. In other words, I find that the higher the level of a firm’s short interest, the 
lower the future earnings surprise of the related firm along the supply chain (customer or supplier). 
 Second, I contribute to the literature on the informativeness of short sale (Dechow et al. 
2001, Asquith et al. 2005 and Desai et al.  2002). While there is a large body of studies providing 
evidence for short seller’s being informed about the future return of overpriced stocks, little is 
known about short sellers’ informed trading in stocks of economically linked firms.16 To fill this 
gap, I study short sellers’ informed trading in firms’ customers and suppliers. I find that suppliers 
with high short interest significantly underperform suppliers with low short interest, this is not the 
case for customers. Using only stocks in the customer firm’s top short-interest quintile, a trading 
strategy that goes short in the supplier firms of the most-shorted quintile of stocks and long in the 
supplier firms of the least-shorted quintile earns a significant 38 basis points per month, or 4.56% 
per year. This difference is not because highly shorted stocks are predominantly micro-cap stocks, 
since the result is robust when I double sort stocks by size and level of short interest. Desai et al. 
(2002) report, for the period July 1988–December 1994, that the negative abnormal performance 
of stocks with high short interest persists for up to 12 months. I find this is true for suppliers but 
not the customers.  
Finally, my paper contributes to the role of short sellers in information flow across the 
supply chain. Particularly, I study the relation between supplier’s short selling and future return 
(earnings surprise) of customer and vice versa. I find that short sellers’ trade help information flow 
                                                            
16 Akbas et al. (2016) find that peer stocks short interest and future return is positively related. 
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across the supply chain. In other words, I find a negative significant correlation between suppliers’ 
(customers’) short interest and customer’s (suppliers’) future earnings surprise. When considering 
the stock return, I only find a significant negative correlation between short interest in supplier and 
future return of customer firms. This means that firm’s short interest contains information about 
the future return of the firm’s customers and this effect is not transient and last up to twelve months. 
On the other hand, there is no significant relation between a firm’s short interest and its supplier’s 
future return. However, I find that a firm’s short interest is positively related to suppliers’ twelve-
month cumulative holding period return. Akbas et al. (2016) find that peer stocks short interest 
and future return is positively related, however my results cannot be related to peer companies 
since on average only 26% of customers and suppliers are in the same industry.   
To understand better the reasons and motivation behind my study, let’s look at short sellers’ 
behavior in two suppliers of Apple, Hon Hai and Pegatron, which between them assemble more 
than half of Apple's iPhones and iPads. In April 2016, Apple reports negative earnings and the 
stock dropped more than 8 percent in the after-market session. One would expect an increase in 
short interest of the two suppliers after poor earnings announcement of the main customer. 
However, short interest in these two suppliers reached its lowest point after April 2016. This might 
seem counterintuitive at first, since literature provide evidence that short sellers are smart and we 
should expect an increase in short selling Apple’s suppliers. But, on the other hand, stock prices 
of Hon Hai and Pegatron barely winced in April. So one might think that the link between Apple 
and its two suppliers are not that important but this is not the case. In fact, short sellers started to 
trade the two suppliers’ stock months before Apple release its earnings announcement. Figure 1 
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shows the increase in short interest in Hon Hai and Pegatron st several months before Apple’s 
earning announcement in April.  
I argue that the information content of short interest for related firms’ stocks along the 
supply chain would be short sale constraints. The negative relationship between firm short interest 
and future returns (earnings surprise) of the customer firm is driven mainly by stocks with the 
highest customer’s short interest. Thus a firm’s short interest predicts future stocks performance 
of the firm’s customers mostly when the level of short interest in the customer firm is high. Fully 
exploiting firm-specific private information may be costly when shorting constraints bind. These 
informed traders, to reduce their trading costs, may then have incentives to strategically make 
information-based trades in the stocks of supplier firms. I find results consistent with this 
explanation. Using regression analysis, I also find that customer firm’s short sellers are informed 
about the future earnings of supplier firm. In other words, I find a negative relation between 
customer short interest and next quarter supplier earning surprise.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a thorough review 
of previous studies, Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main empirical results and 
outlines some implications of results, while Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
In this section, I go over the related literature in more detail. Since my paper contributes to 
investor attention, economic links between firms, and the role of smart investors in related firms, 
I will elaborate the literature and motivation in this section. 
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2.1. Investor Attention 
This paper contributes to the literature of investors’ limited attention and hence their 
underreaction to firm specific news. Due to cognitive capacity constraints, investors may not be 
able to consider all the information at the same time. As a result, they may focus on one particular 
set of information about a firm.  For example, if an individual focuses on understanding the 
implications of the financial report of one firm, he may be unable to study more complex 
information carefully at the same time. Some literature finds evidence of investors’ underreaction 
to firm specific information such as the information of the other firms that are related to it.  
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) study investor’s limited attention on Friday earnings 
announcements and whether it affects the stock prices. The objective of the paper is to provide 
evidence that investors have less attention on Friday comparing to other weekdays. Therefore, 
there will be more drift for Friday announcements and fewer trading volume. As a result of 
investors limited attention we expect lower immediate response and higher delayed response on 
Friday earnings announcement. They find that more than 80% of announcements occur on 
Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, 13.8% occur on Monday, and only 5.7% are on Friday. 
Another finding is that Firms announcing on Friday have more negative earnings surprises and 
10% smaller market capitalization. Then the paper tests the stock price responsiveness to Friday 
earnings versus to non-Friday earnings. Compared to non-Friday announcements, Friday 
announcements exhibit more delayed response and the delayed response is more pronounced for 
negative surprises. The top-to-bottom return for a Friday announcement is (marginally) 
significantly smaller than that of non-Friday announcement (-0.88%) for immediate response. For 
delayed response, the estimated post-earnings announcement drift for Friday announcement 
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compared to non-Friday is positive and significant. The results are consistent with the predictions 
of the model if more investors are inattentive to the information released on Friday. For Friday 
announcements, inattention leads to less immediate response, and more delayed response, as 
investors become aware of the neglected information. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) study investor inattention and how it can results in market 
underreaction. Investor inattention occurs because it is hard to deal with multiple information 
sources or perform multiple tasks at the same time. In their paper, the authors test the investors’ 
attention when there are other earnings announcements on the same day that the firms announce 
its earnings.  To test the distraction hypothesis, first stocks are quarterly sorted based on each 
firm’s earnings surprise and then by the number of earnings announcements by other firms on the 
same day as the firm’s earning announcement. Then according to the number of announcement in 
each day ten decile are constructed. The top decile is the “high news day” and the bottom decile is 
the “low news day”. In each announcement decile, the mean announcement period CAR[0,1] and 
post-announcement period cumulative abnormal returns CAR[2,61] are calculated for the most 
positive and the most negative earnings surprise deciles. A larger spread for CAR[0,1] indicates 
that investors react more strongly to earnings news on the announcement date. A larger spread for 
CAR[2,61] means that investors show more underreaction to earnings news and there is more 
PEAD. The intuition is that on high-news day the degree of investor’s inattention increases which 
leads to more market underreaction and hence stronger PEAD for the firm. The distraction 
hypothesis in their paper is that CAR[0, 1] spread should be smaller and CAR[2,61] should be 
larger for high news day. The results show that the price reactions to earnings news and post 
earnings announcement drift are stronger when earnings are announced on high news day. The 
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main finding is that Investor’s announcement day reaction to earnings news is significantly less 
sensitive to earnings news on high-news days than on low-news days. In other words, when there 
are more competing announcements on the same day, then the investors are less attendant to the 
earnings news.  It is found that the abnormal trading volume is significantly lower when the 
earnings announcement occurs on a high-news day comparing to when it occurs on a low-news 
day. The paper also compares the distraction effects of industry-unrelated versus industry-related 
announcements, big versus small earnings surprises, and large versus small firm announcements. 
The findings are that for industry unrelated announcement and big earnings surprises and has a 
stronger distraction effect. However, surprisingly the announcement of larger firms has a weaker 
effect on the distraction effect. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2011) provide a theoretical model for stock return misreaction to earnings 
announcement when there is investor’s limited attention. They show that different earning’s 
components explain both underreaction and overreaction to earnings announcements. The model 
offers empirical implications about the determinants of the strength of the misreaction effects. 
Previous literature shows that there are both underreaction and overreaction to earnings 
information of a firm. Hirshleifer et al. (2011) considers earnings components. In other words the 
information contained in earnings is divided into information in cash flow and information in 
accruals. In the model, an investor who attends to earnings but does not impound the information 
in earnings components into his valuation overvalues high-accruals firms and undervalues low-
accruals firms. In the model there are two components of earnings (earnings=cash flow + accruals) 
and three types of investors; One set of investors are completely inattentive, the second group are 
those who attend only a subset of the earnings related information and the third group are those 
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investors who attend all publically available information. An attention proxy used in their study is 
the share ownership of institutional versus individual investors. If institutional investors are 
attentive to accruals, cash flows, and earnings, then high institutional ownership and low individual 
ownership should be associated with more earnings and accrual anomaly. Implications for 
empirical work are as follows: (1) if there are some investors who neglect the information in 
current-period earnings as well as cash flow and accruals, then more positive earnings surprises 
are associated with greater undervaluation of the firm, and more negative surprises with greater 
overvaluation; and there is post earnings announcement drift. (2) The average price reaction to the 
earnings surprise and average PEAD increase with the earnings surprise (3) The higher the 
percentage of neglecting investors to earnings, the weaker the average immediate reaction to a 
given earnings surprise, the stronger the relation of misvaluation to the earnings surprise, and the 
stronger the PEAD. (3) A firm with date 1 high (low) cash flows is undervalued (overvalued), and 
subsequently on average earns positive (negative) abnormal returns. (4) If the fraction of investors 
who are unattended to earnings, accrual and cash flow is  sufficiently small relative to the fraction 
of investors attendant to earnings but unattendant to the components, a firm with date 1 accruals 
that are above (below) their unconditional mean is overvalued (undervalued) and subsequently on 
average earns negative (positive) abnormal returns. 
Brown (2014) studies information processing constraint effect on asset mispricing. The 
event studied is Tennis Championships. There are several reasons to choose this event for this 
study; first, there is a clearer separation between zero-information periods and information periods 
than could be expected in any financial market. In other words before the match there is no 
information. Secondly, it takes hours for the information to reveal and it allows the author to take 
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a look at price changes in the presence of information. Another advantage if this event is that it 
allows the author to differentiate between the ability to process the information and the ability to 
receive the information. If traders update the value of one of the assets that they are trading after 
viewing the progress of the match this implies that they have received the necessary information 
to update the value of the other assets that they are trading. Therefore, if mispricing between the 
two assets is due to cognitive limitations, it should be a result of constraints on my ability to process 
information, rather than constraints on my ability to receive information.  
The paper defines two markets; win market and set market. The win market is where bets 
are traded on the winner. The set market on the other hand, allows for betting on the specific score 
by which each player wins. Mispricing is then defined as the absolute difference between the 
implied win probability in the win market and the implied win probability in the set market. A set 
of regressions are done. The dependent variable is mispricing and the explanatory variable of 
interest is a dummy equal to one if the period is during the match and zero otherwise. The paper 
finds that the arrival of information into the Tennis competition means that the traders’ information 
processing constraints become binding and it is a cause of asset mispricing. The magnitude of 
mispricing is higher during the arrival of information period comparing to the period of zero 
information.  
Peng et al. (2006) is a theoretical paper about investor attention. It studies the effect of 
investors’ inattention in asset pricing. It shows that investors with limited attention tend to focus 
more on market- and sector-level information than on firm-specific information. They show that 
there is asset return predictability in presence of investors’ inattention and it increases with 
investor’s overconfidence.  
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Huang and Liu (2007) is another a theoretical paper. The authors show that investors’ 
inattention to important economic news is rational when information production and information 
processing is costly. They developed a model and show that rational inattention changes the 
optimal trading strategy and as a result investors might underinvest or over invest. They also show 
that higher risk averse investors or investors with higher investment horizon chooses less frequent 
but more accurate periodic news. 
Loh (2010) studies Investors’ under-reaction to stock recommendations. There is a 
predictable drift after analysts’ recommendation because the information did not get fully 
incorporated in the stock price when the recommendation was released. For the downgrades it 
might be possible that the underreaction is because of short sale constraints but there is no clear 
reason for upgrades.  Loh states that investor inattention can explain the post recommendation drift 
that is due to investor’s under-reaction. He uses by using prior turnover as a proxy17 for attention. 
The main finding is that low-attention stocks react less to stock recommendations than high-
attention stocks around the three-day event window. Subsequently, the recommendation drift of 
firms with low attention is more than double in magnitude when compared to firms with high 
attention. Each day, firms with recommendation changes are sorted into high prior turnover and 
low prior turnover groups. Then the response of investors to rating changes issued for these two 
groups are compared. The hypothesis here is that for low attention firms, the recommendation 
changes have weaker reactions which means that low attention firms have stronger drift. Basically 
the author examines the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1a: The magnitude of stock 
                                                            
17 Hou et al. (2006), using share turnover as a proxy for investor attention, demonstrate that an earnings momentum 
strategy is more profitable when investors are inattentive. 
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recommendation reaction for firms with low prior turnover is smaller than that for firms with high 
prior turnover. Hypothesis 1b: The magnitude of stock recommendation drift for firms with low 
prior turnover is larger than that for firms with high prior turnover. Hypothesis 1c: The proportion 
of return on the recommendation date as a percentage of the total recommendation return is smaller 
for low prior turnover firms. Analysist recommendation data are from Thomson financials I/B/E/S 
US from 1993 to 2006. The results are robust to controlling for other variables that could be 
associated with trading volume such as illiquidity and uncertainty. The results also hold for 
alternative proxies for attention.  
Ramnath (2004) examines the investors’ reaction to the performance of the firms’ peers in 
the same industry and find investors’ underreaction.   While most of the literature finds that there 
is investors’ underreacting to the related firm’s news, some papers find the opposite results; 
Thomas and Zhang (2008) study that how the stock price of a late announcing firm can be affected 
by early announcements of its peer firms. In other words, they investigate the information 
transition between a firm and its peers when they announce their earnings earlier. The authors state 
that if the information of the early announcing peer firms is incorporated in the stock price of the 
late announcing firm then the price of late announcing firm cannot be predictable. The results of 
their paper show that there is a strong negative correlation between the two prices meaning that 
there is an overreaction to the early announcement of firms in the same industry. And the 
overreaction is corrected when the earning announcement of the late announcing firm is revealed. 
My paper however, contributes to the vast literature on investors’ limited attention and their 
underreaction to information in financial markets. 
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2.2. Related Firms 
 
According to Cohen and Frazzini (2008) when a firm is listed as a major customer in a 
supplier firm, any shock to a customer’s stock price should also have an effect on the supplier’s 
stock price. They find that a large drop in the customer firm stock price leads to a gradual decrease 
of the supplier’s stock price in the following months. Furthermore the predictability of the 
supplier’s return is possible for a period of 6 to twelve months. This is because the information 
about the customer’s stock is not directly incorporated into the suppliers stock price, which 
suggests that investors are inattentive to the news of linked firm; The information available is not 
processed directly by the investors as they are mostly specialized in their own segments of the 
market. However, if the investors are smart and consider the economic link between two firms, 
then supplier’s stock price will adjust and the magnitude of the return predictability will decline 
when the news about the negative shock to the customers firm is published.  
Ahern and Harford (2014) use data from BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis). This data 
set contains all Input and Output trade flows between all producers and buyers in the United States. 
Producers include all industrial, service and household sectors. Buyers include industrial, 
households, and government sectors. Therefore this data set does not include industries. The 
number of reported industries in BEA is from 411 to 478.  Ahern and Harford (2014) first models 
a network of all industries in the US. Each industry is connected to the other industry through 
customer-supplier trade flow. The implication is that any economic shock should transfer along 
this network and the shock travel should be predictable. The economic shock studied in the paper 
is merger waves. There are three hypotheses considered by Ahern and Harford (2014): first, 
mergers in different two industries occur when the two industries have strong trade flows. Second, 
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mergers wave spread across industries with have customer supplier link. Third, the structure of 
customer-supplier network determines which industries are involved in the wave. The first finding 
is that mergers happen rarely in industry pairs. In other words, only 6% of industry pairs experience 
mergers. The authors find that the pattern of cross-industry mergers is very similar to the cross-
industry trade flows. They find that almost only 5% of industry pairs have trade flows. For 
example, industries that have the strongest trade flow in the customer-supplier network (central 
industries; it has the most connections to other industries) and industries that have the most trade 
flows (clustered industries; how embedded a node is in the network) also have these characteristics 
in the merger network meaning that they are more central and clustered in interindustry mergers.  
The second finding is that in customer –supplier network the closer the industries are to each other 
in terms of trade flows the more they have merger activity in the following year but if the two 
industries are not close then the merger activity occurs after two or three years. Therefore the 
merging activity would be like a wave in the customer-supplier network.  
In another study, Menzly and Ozbas (2010) investigate the cross return predictability of 
industries and stock along the supply chain. They show that the extent of cross-predictability is 
negatively related to the level of analyst coverage or by the level of institutional ownership. They 
also find that institutions increase (decrease) their ownership in a stock at the same time that they 
increase (decrease) their ownership in supplier and customer industries. The last finding is that a 
trading strategy of buying industries with high returns in supplier (customer) industries over the 
previous month and simultaneously selling industries with low returns in supplier (customer) 
industries over the previous month yields an annual premium of 7.3% (7%). In their paper they 
also use The Benchmark Input-Output Surveys of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to 
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identify supplier and customer industries for two reasons. First, only the smallest stocks exhibit 
cross-predictability effects based on lagged COMPUSTAT customer returns. This raises questions 
as to whether return cross-predictability is an economically important phenomenon worthy of 
study if it is limited to small stocks. Second, using the customer information database to identify 
supplier firms (in effect, by using reported relationships in the reverse direction) and then testing 
for cross-predictability effects from supplier firm yield no significant results. This is because the 
customer firms reported in COMPUSTAT are typically much larger than the reporting firm. In 
comparison, the BEA Surveys enable us to identify, for each firm, broad portfolios of supplier and 
customer firms whose returns contain economically important information regardless of the size 
of the firm in question. As a result, cross-predictability effects based on the BEA Surveys are 
robust even to the exclusion of small stocks. The main hypothesis in the paper is that firms along 
the supply chain have correlated fundamentals. The other hypothesis is that stock-level returns are 
cross-predictable. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the return of the stock is 
predictable from the lagged return of its supplier and customer. The paper also shows that the 
degree of cross-predictability is lower where there are more informed investors (analysts and 
institutional investors). 
Pandit et al. (2011) studies the economic determinants of information externalities by the 
supplier. The authors study the factors that affect the effect of customer’s return around its 
quarterly earnings announcements on the supplier’s return around that time. The contribution of 
the paper is that the information externality is not limited to firms in the same industries but it also 
exists along the supply chain. In this study the direction of information flow is from customer to 
supplier. They first find evidence that there is actually an information externality experienced by 
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the supplier at the time of customer’s QEA. The information externality experienced by the 
supplier is increasing in: (1) the magnitude of the news contained in customers’ QEAs (2) the 
strength of the economic link between a supplier and its customer; (3) customers’ COGS; and (4) 
the level of uncertainty at the time of customer’s QEA and it is decreasing in supplier’s earnings 
persistence. 
Zhu (2014), by using 1083 unique link of firms and their customers from 1983 to 2011, 
shows that the supplier’s return is predictable from the firm’s earnings announcement. In other 
words, Zhu studies whether market underreact to customer earnings announcement as a result of 
investors’ inattention. The author provides evidence that the supplier‘s three-day cumulative 
abnormal return is positively affected by the customer earnings announcement around the 
announcement day.  So there is immediate responsiveness of supplier’s stock returns surrounding 
customer announcements. This result is in contrast with Cohen and Frazzini (2008) who report 
that stock prices do not fully reflect news involving related firms, which generates predictable 
subsequent price moves.  The author also looked at the responsiveness of the supplier stock price 
to the customer earnings announcement following the announcement. He finds that when customer 
earnings surprise changes from lowest decile to the highest decile then the delayed abnormal return 
of the supplier would increase. This results support the hypothesis that the investors’ inattention 
causes market underreaction. The paper also studies how much the post earnings announcement 
drift in customer returns results in supplier’s delay in adjusting the price. Because the PEAD of 
customer results in customer higher post return and this translates to supplier’s higher post return. 
So the predictability of the supplier’s return is due to higher customer’s return therefore in this 
case there would be no investor inattention and investors are rational and take into account the link 
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between supplier and customer however the PEAD of customer leads to the delay in suppliers 
return. He finds consistent results.  
Banerjee et al. (2008) argue how supplier-customer link affects the capital structure 
decisions of firms in the Compustat database.  First, their paper shows that the debt ratio of firms 
in durable goods industries is decreasing in the importance of purchases from suppliers who are 
dependent on these firms for a major part of their sales. In bilateral relationships, particularly in 
durable goods industries, it is likely that the produced product is unique, therefore it requires 
specific investment. On the other hand, if a firm has several customers then the product is more 
likely standardized instead of being unique. The main hypothesis is that the customer’s leverage 
(debt ratio) is lower when the input from its dependent supplier is more important. And the effect 
is stronger when the customer is in an industry with durable product. The supplier-customer link 
can also affect the leverage of the supplier. Because suppliers are less diversified their survival 
depends on the business with their customer and the loss of business might destabilize them. 
Therefore the supplier might have lower leverage. The second hypothesis therefore is about the 
supplier firm; a supplier has lower debt ratio if he link with its customer is more important 
practically in the case of durable goods industries with unique product. The data are from Business 
information Compustat segment file. The sample is from 1979 to 1997.Regression analysis is done 
for empirical study. The dependent variable is therefore the market leverage of the firm, where the 
market leverage, is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to the market value of equity plus total 
debt. The independent variables are purchases from dependent manufacturing suppliers from 
different sectors as a fraction of Cost of Goods Sold of the customer firms. The sample is divided 
according to whether the firms belong to the durable or nondurable goods manufacturing sector. 
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The results show that durable sector customers who rely on dependent suppliers for a larger 
proportion of their inputs maintain significantly lower market leverage. But in nondurable goods 
manufacturing sector, the effect is not significant. The intuition is that when specific investments 
are more important, customers choose lower debt ratios to encourage more specific investment by 
dependent suppliers in the durable sector when they purchase more from them. The same 
regression analysis for suppliers show that suppliers in durable manufacturing sectors have lower 
debt ratios to reduce the costs of financial distress that would have to be incurred in the event they 
lose their principal customers. 
Cheng and Eshleman (2014) show that the supplier shareholders overreact to customer 
earnings news because that news contains imprecise information about the supplier’s future cash 
flows and this overreaction will be corrected when the suppliers announce their own earnings. The 
evidence shows that supplier’s abnormal returns around its earnings announcement are negatively 
correlated with supplier abnormal returns at the earlier customers’ earnings announcements. The 
negative correlation means that the supplier’s shareholders are overreacting to the customer’s 
earnings announcement. The degree of overreaction, however, depends on how strong the link is 
between supplier and customer. If they are strongly economically linked, then the degree of 
overreaction declines. The information regarding the firm’s main customers gives an imprecise 
signal about the firm’s future cash flow, since good or bad news for a customer does not always 
translate to good or bad news for the supplier. For instance, there might be some segments of the 
customer firm with increased sales but these segments are unrelated to the supplier. Therefore, in 
this case customer’s earnings announcement might have good news which does not give a signal 
about the supplier’s performance.  The sample includes 45,319 supplier-customer-quarter 
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observations. Data are from 1976 to 2009 from Compustat Segment file. The data that supplier’s 
earnings announcement is before the customer’s earnings announcement is removed from the 
sample. Cheng and Eshleman (2014) use both portfolio approach and regression analysis. Their 
paper focuses on the quarterly earnings announcements of a firm’s customers, rather than its 
suppliers.  
In another paper, Fee et al. (2006) study about the relation between supplier and customer. 
The paper studies whether the customers have an equity stake in their suppliers and what factors 
are important in having ownership in the supplier firm. The authors used a sample of more than 
10,000 separate links between customer and supplier from Compustat segment file. The data are 
from 1988 to 2001. The main findings of the paper is that the factors that are most important in 
having equity stakes in the supplier firm is the percentage sales of supplier to customer or in other 
words the degree of supplier’s dependence on the customer. Secondly, they find that in general 
most customers don’t have shares in their supplier (only 3% of the sample). Another finding is that 
equity stakes are more common when the supplier is a R&D intensive firm which means that the 
annual expenditure on R&D is high relative to the total asset. Next, the suppliers with negative 
free cash flow are more likely to have their customers as block holders. If the customer has 
ownership in its supplier, then the link between the two lasts longer, because in this case, customer 
will also represent on the supplier’s board. Age and size of the suppliers are studied relative to the 
customers. Suppliers are much smaller but younger and younger suppliers are more likely to have 
an equity hold by the customer.  
Another example of studies about information transmission between supplier and customer 
is the study done by Hertzel et al (2008). They study whether a firm’s industry rivals, suppliers or 
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customers responses to its financial distress. The analysis of customers and suppliers in the paper 
provides a better understanding of how impairment (both economic and financial) at one firm can 
ripple through other layers of the supply chain. In addition to the effects of bankruptcy filings, the 
effects of pre-filing distress on rivals, suppliers, and customers. The data of bankruptcy filings are 
sample of 1,695 bankruptcy filings between 1978 and 2004 from Bankruptcy DataSource Index. 
The firm’s customers are extracted from Compustat Segment file, since public firms disclose the 
amount of revenue derived from each customer that accounts for at least 10% of total revenue. To 
form the firm’s suppliers, all Compustat firms that list a filing firm as a ‘‘major’’ customer are 
identified by employing a text-matching program to match the text abbreviation for the customer’s 
name to one of the filing firms and then they are visually ensured for accuracy. The matches are 
restricted to five years prior to filing date. To form the sample of customers, the process is reversed 
and all Compustat firms listed by the filing firms as major customers are identified.  There is an 
asymmetry in the customer and supplier sample, because while the procedure identifies customers 
that are important to the filing firms, it is not necessarily that these customers are reliant on the 
firms (suppliers are more reliant than customers on the filing firms).Therefore, the paper also 
examines a subset of reliant customers defined as those for which purchases from the filing firm 
scaled by total cost of goods sold is greater than 1%. For the full sample of 250 filing firms, they 
identify a total of 311 customers and 275 suppliers. Furthermore, neither suppliers nor customers 
appear to be significantly impaired by the filing firm’s bankruptcy, i.e. their abnormal returns are 
insignificantly different from zero when horizontal rivals experience positive returns in the filing 
period.  
65 
 
Harford et al. (2017) study the effect of economic link between firms on the merger 
activity. In other words, they investigate how the economic linkage affect the probability that the 
firm become acquired, which firms are most likely merged, which target attracts more bidders, and 
which mergers have the greatest effect on the merging value. The paper explains that acquisition 
not only affects the firms involved in it but also it has an -impact on the firms that are economically 
linked to the target or acquirer. Economic link between firms increase the probability that one firm 
acquire the other one. Two firms might be connected through social network among boards or 
through supplier-customer link, however, the paper only considers the supply chain type of 
connection because it mostly leads to social connection. Making an acquisition across a customer-
supplier link is one way to protect relationship-specific investments, and better expand the 
investment. The first hypothesis is that bidders are more attracted to firms with many economic 
links, for instance a firm with many customers. The second hypothesis is that the more a firm is 
economically linked to other firms the stronger the merger value creation is. The data are from 
Compustat Segment File from 1991-2009. There are some unobserved connections in this data set 
because it only includes the customers that account for 10% or more of firms’ sales. Therefore any 
connection with less than 10% sale is ignored. The paper uses BEA data set in order to include the 
average industry input outputs to control for these unobserved connections. The 10% cutoff in the 
dataset might have size concern, in other words, the customer supplier connection is only proxing 
for size. It might include only small firms because the only firms with huge customers are small 
firms. But, the authors show that the average size for acquirers/targets with large customer is very 
close to average size of acquires/targets without large customers. The mergers and acquisition data 
are extracted from SDC. The paper uses logit regression to investigate the effect of customer-
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supplier link on merging probability. First, they define different measures for economic ties of the 
acquirer or target. These measures are direct or indirect. The measure of direct vertical connections 
identify when target or acquirer is a customer of the other one. An indirect connection is when 
both firms supply to the same customer, both firms are customers of the same supplier, or both 
firms are in the same industry. Direct measure is like the firm’s centrality (number of customer or 
suppliers it has). The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes one if the firm is a target 
or acquirer and zero otherwise. Other control variables include the firm characteristics for acquirer 
and target. The matched sample of 5 pseudo-deals per real deal was obtained by matching the 5 
nearest neighbors by propensity score using non-network control variables. The results show that 
it is more likely that firms acquire their customer than acquiring its matched peers or be acquired 
by their supplier than being acquired by matched peers. In addition merging is more likely when 
the two parties share a common customer or supplier. Rival firms or firm within the same industry 
are also more likely to merge compare to matched peer firms. For the second hypothesis that how 
much the economic link between the two parties affects the merging value, mutivariate regression 
is done with acquirer’s announcement return (CAR(-1,+1)) as dependent variable and measure of 
direct and indirect economic ties as explanatory variables. Direct measure of economic link are 
considered when two firms are linked together through customer-supplier link or in other words 
one of them is customer and the other the supplier, and indirect measure is when two firms share 
a common supplier or customer. Evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that mergers with more 
economic links create more value.   
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2.3. The Role of Informed Traders in the Stock Market and Related Firms 
My study investigates the role of short sellers in related firms. There is a large body of 
literature which suggests that short sellers are informed about future returns. Boehmer, Jones and 
Zhang (2008) find that short constraints are not widespread since shorting account for more than 
12.9% of NYSE volume. They state that short sellers are informed and contribute to efficient stock 
prices, particularly institutional short sales are the most informative. The sample they use consists 
of all NYSE system order daily data records related to short sales from January 2000 to April 2004.  
To find the cross section of short selling and future return of stock, the authors first do the single 
sort. According to the authors the portfolio approach is the best way to measure the cross sectional 
differences. Because first it minimizes the effect of outliers and second because it is easier to 
interpret.  For single sort, on each trading day firms are sorted into based on the short-selling 
activity measure (number of shares shorted and shorting’s share of volume18) over 5 trading days 
and then quintile portfolios are constructed. Then value-weighted portfolios are held for 20 trading 
days.  Then Daily calendar-time returns and Fama and French (1993) three-factor alphas are 
reported. If short sellers are informed, then we expect that the excess return and Fama French three 
factor alpha be negative for heavily shorted stocks portfolio (bottom quintile) and positive for 
lightly shorted stocks (top quintile) portfolio. The results show that Fama French alpha for heavily 
shorted portfolio is on average –0.24% per month and for lightly shorted portfolio is 2.55% per 
month. These numbers show that short sellers are relatively informed about the stock and avoid 
                                                            
18 They find that the standardized shorting measure (shorting’s share of volume) has a more modest but opposite 
correlation to market cap. On average, large stocks tend to experience light shorting by these measures. But 
unstandardized short measure which is the number of shares shorted is positively related to the size of the stock. Which 
make sense since larger cap stocks have more shares outstanding. 
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the undervalued stocks. However, the alpha for heavily shorted stock portfolio is -0.24 or almost 
zero so we cannot say that short sellers are mostly interested in the overvalued stock. Boehmer et 
al state that short sellers keep prices in line rather than bringing prices back into line. They also 
look at the return spread between the heavily and lightly shorted portfolios and found that heavily 
shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted stocks. The authors also look at the double sorting 
results to confirm that the results are not simply because of characteristics that are associated with 
cross-sectional differences in average returns. The methodology is that first stocks are sorted into 
quintiles based on size, market-to-book, stock return volatility, or turnover for the previous month 
and then within a characteristic quintile, they are sorted based on shorting flow over the past 5 
trading days. The results are still consistent with the hypothesis after controlling for characteristics 
that affect the stock return. Another findings of the paper is that compared to stocks that are lightly 
shorted by institutions, the quintile of stocks most heavily shorted by institutions in a given week 
underperforms by 1.43% over the next 20 trading days (more than 19.6% on an annualized basis). 
Diether et al. (2009) find that short sellers ‘trades correspond to 31% and 24% of share 
volume on Nasdaq and the NYSE, respectively. This means that the costs of borrowing stocks for 
short sales are not constraining US short sellers significantly. They also find the determinants of 
short shelling activity. The paper finds evidence that short-selling activity is higher for large-
capitalization stocks, growth stocks, stocks with high institutional ownership, high price stocks, 
and stocks with actively traded put options. The paper finds evidence that short sellers increase 
their activity after periods of positive returns, on days with significant buying pressure, and on 
days with high levels of asymmetric information. It shows that short-selling activity is associated 
with negative abnormal future returns. A strategy that goes long in stocks with low short-selling 
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activity and sells short stocks with high short-selling activity would generate significant positive 
abnormal returns of roughly 1.4% per month. Using regression approach, the paper finds that both 
high short-selling activity and high buying pressure today predict significant negative future 
abnormal returns. Another finding is that higher short-selling activity today is associated with 
subsequent decline in buying pressure. Overall the evidence in the paper supports the hypothesis 
that short sellers help correct short-term stock price overreaction to information. To show that 
short sellers trade on short-term overreaction and increase their shortselling activity after periods 
of high returns, the paper uses panel data; short sales during day t are regressed on past 5 days 
return including control variables. The control variables are current return, the day t stock-level 
effective spread, daily buy-order imbalance ,  the difference in the high and low price on day t 
divided by the high price: (high − low)/high, average daily σ from day t − 5 to day t – 1, average 
daily share turnover of a stock for day t − 5 to day −1, a dummy that equals 1 if a stock is in the 
lowest (highest) r−5,−1 quintile for NYSE (Nasdaq) stocks.  Coefficient of past return in the 
regression is highly significant (positive coefficient) in univariate setting and also highly 
significant even after including the controls. In order to show that increased short-selling activity 
should predict future abnormal negative returns, the paper applies portfolio approach; the authors 
first compute short activity quintiles for each market on date t and form portfolios on day t using 
stocks with a closing price on day t − 1 greater than or equal to $5. They then compute size and 
book-to-market adjusted returns based on the standard 25 value weighted portfolios (Fama and 
French, 1993) for each portfolio. The portfolios are value weighted and rebalanced daily and skip 
one day (t+1). The holding period is once considered only t+2 and once t+2 to t+5. If short sellers 
can predict the future return then the portfolio that includes stocks which are heavily shorted on 
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day t has negative abnormal return and the difference in high and low portfolio (low-high) has 
positive abnormal return. The results are consistent with the hypothesis.  
Hirshleifer et. al (2011) test whether short arbitrageurs respond to firm overvaluation, and 
whether they succeed in correcting it. The overvalued firms in this study are those firms which 
have had high accruals at the end of the previous year. According to Fama and French (2010) 
accrual anomaly is among the most pervasive financial anomalies. Under this hypothesis, high 
accrual firms are overvalued, and have subsequent low abnormal returns when this overvaluation 
is corrected. Similarly, low accruals cause undervaluations. And firms with low accruals have 
subsequent positive abnormal returns. Therefore, accrual anomaly causes market inefficiency. 
Since short sellers are informed, it is expected that they would increase their activity in 
firms with high accrual anomaly. Therefore the test done here is first a univariate test. In this test, 
the authors examine whether the relation between short interest and accruals is positive. They find 
strong evidence of this hypothesis. Particularly, they find that high-accrual firms have higher short 
interest. In this test they construct decile portfolios based on accruals. They find that short arbitrage 
activity is mainly limited to the top accruals decile. In addition they tested whether the effect is 
different between NASDAQ and NYSE. They find that short arbitrage of accrual anomaly is 
stronger among NASDAQ firms, for which the mean short interest in the highest accrual decile is 
over 40% higher than the mean short interest of the lowest accrual decile. Hirshleifer et. al (2011) 
also test whether short arbitrage constraints cause asymmetry in return predictability on the short 
side of the accrual anomaly relative to its long side. The asymmetry in return predictability in the 
paper is defined as the difference of absolute returns in top-decile and bottom-decile and it is used 
as an indicator of the relative effectiveness of short versus long arbitrage. They also examine a 
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multivariate test that includes controls. They find a significant positive relationship between 
accruals and short interest even in multivariate test. In his paper they consider institutional 
ownership as a proxy for easiness of short arbitrage. Because more institutional ownership means 
that there are more loanable shares available to borrow. They added an interaction term of 
IO*accrual in the regression. They find that for the firm which the Institutional ownership is 
higher, the effect of short arbitrage of accrual anomaly is stronger. They also control for 
uncertainty and investor disagreement about a stock. Because according to D’Avolio (2002) when 
there is more disagreement about a stock should increase short interest regardless of whether there 
is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly. Therefore they use following controls for uncertainty: 
Analyst following: Analyst following can affect the accuracy of market perceptions and 
susceptibility to investor misperceptions (which can potentially overwhelm the arbitrage capital of 
investors who are willing to sell short). Residual standard deviation and leverage: They are used 
as proxies for the risk of arbitrage, which should increase return asymmetry. Book-to-market: since 
there is likely to be more disagreement about growth firms than mature firms. They also use a 
dummy variable for negative profit of the firm.  
Aitken, etal. (1998) uses short sales data on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) to 
confirm that short sales are bad news, and to precisely measure the negative cumulative abnormal 
return on both a fifteen-minute interval and transaction-to-transaction basis. It is concluded that in 
a market in which short sales are fully transparent moments after execution, they are almost 
instantaneously bad news. The main contribution of the paper is first studying a market setting in 
which information on short trades is transparent just after execution (ASX) (Short sale data are in 
real time), second analyzing price behavior utilizing abnormal returns based on precisely matched 
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trades following short selling activity on an intraday basis and third differentiating between short 
trades executed through market orders and limit orders. Regression analysis is also carried out to 
determine under what conditions short trades are more (or less) likely to be informative.  
In Diamond and Verrechia (1987) model, the costs associated with short selling will 
squeeze liquidity traders out of such order flow, therefore short orders are more informative than 
regular sell orders. Hence, short sales will help price adjustment at the time such information is 
made public. In ASX, short selling is made public shortly after the time of trade, therefore all 
market participants can observe short sales, and, as a result, negative abnormal returns are expected 
to be associated with short trades. (In U.S. markets the announcement of past short position in a 
stock is made up to one month later.) 
Figlewski and Webb (1993) argue that short selling in options-listed stocks is less likely to 
be informative, because informed traders utilize the options market where the costs of shorting are 
lower. They find that stocks with traded options are less likely to be associated with negative 
abnormal returns following the short sale. 
Chen and Singal (2003) find evidence for another explanation of weekend effect. Weekend 
effect which is remained an unexplained anomaly is defined as higher return on Fridays and lower 
return on Mondays. In the paper, the role of speculative short sales are examined and finds 
evidence that speculative short sellers cover their positions on Friday to avoid the risk associated 
with the inability of monitoring the stock market during non-trading days and then their reopen 
their position on Mondays. This trading behavior partly explains the weekend effect. By covering 
their position on Friday, the stocks prices go up and then by reopening their positions on Monday 
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the stocks prices are moved down. The paper studies the relation between relative short interest 
and the weekend effect (Friday’s return minus Monday’s return). The authors reason that short 
sellers are willing to buy put options if the stock has actively traded options instead of short sales 
because short sales are risky positions. Therefore there should be a negative relation between the 
number of put option traded and the weekend effector in other words, the higher the put option is 
traded the lower is the weekend effect. The results show that stocks with listed options have a 
significantly smaller weekend effect.  
Asquith et al. (2005) investigate the relation between the short interest and the future 
abnormal return. Stocks with high level of short interest ratios and low level of institutional 
ownership are considered to be short sale constrained, because the demand is high (level of short 
interest) while the supply (level of institutional ownership) is low. For stock which short sale 
constraint is biding the hypothesis is that they will underperform the market. They use portfolio 
construction approach. First all the stocks were ranked based on short interest ratios and each 
portfolio is then ranked based on institutional ownership. They find that those stocks in top decile 
short interest portfolio (highly shored) and in the lowest third institutional ownership underperform 
relative to a four-factor model by 215 basis point per month on an EW basis. In the paper short 
selling are classified to short selling for arbitrage or overvaluation reason. Then one type of 
arbitrage short, convertible arbitrage is investigated. As a proxy outstanding convertible bond is 
used. The findings show that convertible bond arbitrage is a major reason for high short interest. 
The paper shows that arbitrage shorts do not underperform much.  
Desai et al. (2002) study the relation between the level of short interest and the following 
abnormal return in NASDAQ. They find that firms with higher level of short interest experience 
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negative abnormal return. Calendar time portfolio approach is used. Monthly equally weighted 
portfolio excess return of stocks with at least 2.5% short interest is regressed on Fama French and 
Carhart factors and results in an alpha of -0.76 percent per month. The authors also form portfolios 
of firms with short interest in the 90th and 95th percentile or higher in the previous month. The 
portfolios are rebalanced monthly to only keep the firms with short interest above 90th and 95th 
percentile. The results still shows a negative significant relation between short interest and stock 
return. So Desai et al. (2002) conclude that short selling is a bearish signal. The results for the 
value weighted analysis show that abnormal return is less negative, but still relatively large and 
significant.  
According to Dechow et al. (2001) Short sellers target firms with low fundamental-to-price 
such as cash flow to price, earnings to price, book to market and value to market. Short sellers use 
these ratios to identify overpriced stocks and will cover their position when prices decline. The 
firms are sorted each year into six categories based on the magnitude of the short position in the 
stock. For each category, the mean one-year-ahead abnormal return is calculated for each year. 
The results show a negative relation between the short sale and future return. The other method 
used in the paper is constructing portfolios based on fundamental to price. 10 portfolios are 
constructed; portfolio contains stocks with the lowest fundamental to price while portfolio 10 
includes stocks with the highest fundamental to price. Abnormal return is the most negative for 
portfolio 1 and 2 and increases monotonically as we go from portfolio 1 to 10. Then in each 
portfolio of fundamentals to price, the stocks are categorized to highly shorted and lightly shorted. 
The results show that not all stocks with low fundamentals to price ratios are heavily shorted. The 
authors state that there are two reasons why some of stocks with low fundamental to price ratios 
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are not heavily shorted. The first reason is the high transaction cost of short selling and the other 
reason might be that short sellers have additional information that the stock is not overpriced. The 
results indicate that short sellers are attracted to low fundamentals to price ratio stocks but avoid 
stocks with high transaction costs (larger stocks, stocks with low institutional ownership or low 
dividend yield). The results also support that short sellers have additional information about a stock 
that has low fundamental to price ratio but not overpriced. For instance firms with low short 
positions have significantly larger price increases relative to firms with high short positions.  
 Drake et al. (2015) study the role of short sellers in impounding the future earnings 
information in current stock prices. There is a concern of reverse causality, because short sellers 
might select firms with high future earnings which results in a selection bias. To help control for 
the selection bias, the paper uses Heckman selection model. In the first stage, they run a probit 
regression with probability of short selling as the dependent variable. The exogenous independent 
variable considered in the first stage is a variable indicating whether the firm has outstanding 
convertible debt. We expect that firms with high convertible debt are highly shorted versus firms 
without convertible debt. But convertible debt will not impact the relation between the current 
return and future earnings. Then Inverse Mills ratio is calculated and included in next models to 
control for selection bias. 
There are studies that investigate the role of smart investors in related firms. An example 
is a paper recently working by Akbas et al. (2016). The paper studies the information flow between 
peer stocks and the effect of short sellers trading on peer stocks’ future share prices. They show 
that higher short interest in a stock is significantly and positively associated with future returns 
and earnings surprises of the closest competitor. Therefore, the study provides evidence that 
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informed trading not only affects the stock’s own prices but also has an impact on the future prices 
on of the competitors. The former effect is negative while the latter is positive. The main 
hypothesis in the paper is that short interest contains information about peer stocks. The result 
support the hypothesis and is robust to various control variables such as the firm’s own short 
interest, stock price momentum, size, institutional ownership, book- to-market. The authors find 
out that industry lead-lag effects, industry momentum and competitors past return and trading 
activity do not explain the findings. In another test, longer horizons return (12 month) is regressed 
on the previous variables.  The result is similar suggesting that the effect of short selling on the 
stock return of peers does not reverse within a few months, therefore the information of short 
sellers is related to firm fundamentals and the return effect is based on information.  The authors 
also test the relationship between short interest and the earnings surprises in the competing firms. 
They repeat the regression using quarterly regressions, where the dependent variable is the 
quarterly earnings surprises. They use standardized unexpected earnings as a measure of earnings 
surprise.  The results show that the effect of competing firm short interest is positive and significant 
but one this of the effect of firm’s own short interest (which is negative effect). So the results 
suggest that short sellers trade peer stocks because they are informed rather than being short term 
speculative.  
In another study, Alldredge et al. (2014) show that insiders make profit by attentive trading 
based on public information. The public information used in the paper is the information regarding 
the customers and suppliers which is available for public. Since insiders are more attentive to their 
firms customers information they are able to make profit based on that information. The paper 
finds that insiders of the firms that sell a large amount of their product to principal customers make 
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more profit from stock sales (not purchase) comparing to insiders in non-linked firms. The insiders 
in linked firms make profit by monitoring the performance of the firm’s principal customers and 
the customers’ past return predict the abnormal return of the insiders following the sales. 
To test the hypothesis the authors uses two different approaches. First, they compare insider 
trading returns at firms with economically linked customers to insider trading return in firms with 
no economic links. The paper finds NYSE size-adjusted decile one month CARs following insider 
trades. To be consistent with the hypothesis one would expect that CARs following the insider 
sales be negative. The results show that CARs following the insider sales is more negative for the 
linked firms versus non-linked firms. The next methodology is multivariate approach. In this 
method excess one month return following trade months is regressed on the equal weighted market 
return and a set of control variables (firm’s market value, book to market and prior firm’s stock 
return). The authors also run the regressions using only trades at linked suppliers that were done 
in the first year of the relationship; in this way they want to recognize whether insiders use their 
private information or public information to make profit. Because, during the first year of 
relationship, the link might not have yet been disclosed to public. The regression results show that 
there is no significant negative abnormal return following insiders’ sales or purchases during the 
first year of link. However, the results show that for insiders’ sales for linked firms with negative 
customer lagged return the abnormal return following the sales is negative and significant. The 
result is not significant for insider’s purchases.  
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3. Data Analysis 
3.1. Customer Supplier Data 
The data are obtained from several sources. Regulation SFAS No. 131 requires firms to report 
the identity of customers representing more than 10% of their total sales in the financial reports 
issued to shareholders. I extract the identity of the firm’s principal customers from the Compustat 
segment files.  My customer data cover the period between 1981 and 2015. For each firm I 
determine whether the customer is another company listed on the CRSP and I assign it the 
corresponding CRSP permno number. However, prior to 1998, most firms’ customers were listed 
as an abbreviation of the customer name, which may vary across firms or over time. For these 
firms, I use a Fuzzy matching algorithm. First I generate a list of potential matches to the customer 
name, I assign a score to each match and I then visually hand-match the customer to the 
corresponding permno number by looking at the firm’s name, segment, and industry information.19 
I am very conservative in matching procedure and firm identifiers to make sure that customers are 
matched to the appropriate stock returns and financial information. Customers for which I could 
not identify a unique match are excluded from the sample. Following Cohen and Frazzini (2008), 
to ensure that the firm–customer relations are known before the returns they are used to explain, I 
impose a 6-month gap between fiscal year-end dates and stock returns. This mimics the standard 
gap imposed to match accounting variables to subsequent price and return data. Table 1 shows 
summary statistics for the sample. In Panel A, I report the statistics for the number of suppliers 
and customers in my sample. Panel A also shows that on average 76% of firm–customer relations 
                                                            
19 I am thankful to Andrea Frazzini for providing the clean customer-supplier links from 1981 till 2005. I was able to 
validate the results of my matching algorithm to Cohen and Frazzini (2008). 
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are between firms in different industries. Thus, as mentioned in Cohen and Frazzini (2008), the 
stock return predictability is mostly related to assets in different industries as opposed to securities 
within the same industry. From summary statistics in Panel B, we also see that number of 
customers per firm is on average 1.66 with maximum of 21 customers per firm.  
3.2. Short Interest Data and Related Data 
My empirical tests examine the ability of short sellers to predict low return on the basis of 
public information about related firms’ (customers’ or suppliers’) financial health. Monthly short 
interest data are obtained from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ20 for the 
period of 1988 to 2015. Short interest shows the open short positions of stocks with settlements on 
the last business day on or before the 15th of each month. Following Asquith et al. (2005), I 
calculate monthly raw short interest for each firm, as the percent of total shares outstanding in that 
month. Shares outstanding data are obtained from CRSP. The final sample consists of all NYSE 
or NASDAQ-listed common stocks for which monthly short interest reports are available over the 
period from 1988 to 2015. Table 2 Panel A. shows the summary statistics for raw short interest in 
my sample. The average short interest in the universe is 2.16%, while suppliers’ short interest is 
2.32% and customers’ short interest is 2.50%. These statistics shows that short interest is on 
average higher in suppliers. This result is consistent with Boehmer et al. (2008). They find that 
relative short measure has opposite correlation to the market cap. They find that large stocks have 
light shorting compared to small stocks when we scale the shorting measure by the number of 
                                                            
20 I am thankful to Honghui Chen for providing the monthly short interest data for NASDAQ up to 2003 (Chen et al. 
2003). 
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shares outstanding. Although smaller stocks are more expensive to short (Geczy et al. 2002)21, the 
relative short interest in suppliers is close to customers in terms of statistics, this might be because 
short sellers have more information advantage in small stocks. The higher informational advantage 
comes from the fact that smaller stocks have relative shortage of research coverage and other 
readily available sources of information. The time series statistics of short interest in suppliers 
versus customers is shown in Figure 2. We can see a smooth increase in level of short interest in 
all firms, suppliers and customers and then there is a drop in short interest starting the end of year 
2008 when the financial crisis begins. The reason for the sudden drop is the short sales regulations 
issued during the financial crisis of 2008. In September 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued an emergency order that temporarily banned most short sales in nearly 
1,000 financial stocks (Boehmer et al. 2013, Kolasinski, et.al. 2013). As a result of the short sale 
ban, the cost of borrowing stock increased dramatically in the period of the Emergency Order. 
Therefore shorting activity dropped by approximately 32%, 26% and 35% respectively for all 
firms in universe, customer firms and supplier firms.  
In addition to raw short interest data, I also calculate a measure of abnormal short interest. I 
follow Karpoff et al. (2010) for measuring monthly abnormal short interest. For firm i in month t, 
abnormal short interest is calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡)                    (2.1) 
                                                            
21 In this paper, the return predictability that I find does not account for any potential costs of shorting.  
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Where 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 is raw short interest and 𝐸(𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡) is the expected short interest controls for the firm’s 
market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, past stock performance, and industry. Following 
Karpoff et al. (2010), I first sort all stocks (excluding customer and supplier firms in my sample) 
based on size, book-to-market and momentum (all measured at the end of the previous month). 27 
portfolios are then constructed based on all three independent sorts. Next, at the beginning of each 
month, each stock is assigned to one of 27 portfolios. Each of the 27 portfolios is next partitioned 
into industry groups using two-digit SIC codes. I run the following multivariate regression to get 
the 𝐸(𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡).  
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗=𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∑ 𝑚𝑗𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗=𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∑ 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗=𝑙𝑜𝑤         (2.2) 
The independent variables are dummies that define the 27 benchmark portfolios. For instance, 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑚𝑒𝑑,𝑡 =1 if firm i is assigned to the portfolio with the medium market capitalization in month 
t. That means for this stock at month t the two other dummies related to size are zero. In other 
words, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑡 = 0 and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 = 0. Similarly, industry dummy 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 equal one if firm i 
belongs to industry s  in month t and zero otherwise. The fitted values from each monthly cross-
sectional regression are used to estimate the expected short interest for each firm in each month 
(𝐸(𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡), which is used to calculate the abnormal short interest 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡). Table 2. 
Panel B. Shows the coefficient of the regression in equation 2 and Panel C. shows the summary 
statistics of abnormal short interest for supplier and customer. 
I also require the availability of at least one month of past return data from CRSP. I control 
for size which is the market value of equity calculated as the previous month-end number of shares 
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outstanding times share price. I control for lagged returns of each stock, MOM and its customers, 
MOM. MOM is the cumulative return over the past twelve months and captures the momentum 
effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Table 3 shows the correlation matrix. The 
correlation between supplier’s short interest and customer’s short interest is 0.12. The relatively 
small positive correlation suggests that the two measures capture different information. Customer 
relative short interest is negatively correlated with customer’s size and the customer firm’s own 
future return. However, the magnitude of correlation between customer short and its own future 
return is very small (-0.006). We cannot see any significant correlation between customer short 
interest and supplier firm’s future return, meaning that customer’s short does not predict suppliers’ 
return. On the other hand, looking at the correlation between supplier’s short and the firm’s own 
future return, we see a negative correlation of (-0.017). Supplier’s short, however is positively 
correlated with supplier size and customer size. In the meantime, there is a negative and significant 
correlation between supplier short and customer’s return, which means suppliers’ short contains 
information about the future return of customers. I will confirm these results in the analysis section 
with running multiple regressions and portfolio construction.  
 For data analysis, first, I replicate Cohen and Frazzini (2008), and I find the evidence for 
return predictability along the supply chain. Table 4 shows the results of return predictability for 
the full sample.  The results show that investors underreact to firm specific information. Investors 
fail to consider the information about the firms that are economically linked to the main firm and 
as a result the predictability of return exists across assets. In particular, stock prices underreact to 
negative (positive) news involving related firms, and in turn generate negative (positive) 
subsequent price drift. To test this hypothesis, I follow Cohen and Frazzini (2008). Particularly, at 
83 
 
the beginning of each month I rank all suppliers in an ascending order according to abnormal return 
of their customers in the previous month. If a supplier has more than one customer, then equally 
weighted or value weighted abnormal return is considered. Then construct quintile portfolios of 
suppliers. The top quintile contains the suppliers whose customers have had best performance in 
the previous month and the bottom in the quintile is the portfolio that contains the suppliers whose 
customers have had the poorest performance in the previous month. If the market is inefficient 
then we expect predictable returns, in other words, the negative shock to firms will affect their 
related firms with a lag. I report returns in month t of portfolios formed by sorting on customer 
returns in month t−1. The first row shows the returns of a zero-cost portfolio that holds the top 
20% high customer return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low customer return stocks. To 
be included in the portfolio, a firm must have a non-missing customer return and non-missing 
stock price at the end of the previous month. Separating stocks according to the lagged return of 
related firms induces large differences in subsequent returns. Looking at the difference between 
high customer return and low customer return stocks, it is striking that high (low) customer returns 
today predict high (low) subsequent stock returns of a related firm. The customer momentum 
strategy that is long the top 20% good customer news stocks and short the bottom 20% bad 
customer news stocks delivers Fama and French (1993) abnormal returns of 1.07% per month (t-
statistic = 6.68). Adjusting returns for the stock’s own price momentum by augmenting the factor 
model with Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor has a negligible effect on the results. Subsequent 
to portfolio formation, the baseline long–short portfolio earns abnormal returns of 0.96% per 
month (t-statistic = 5.97). The results show that even after controlling for past returns, high (low) 
customer momentum stocks earn high (low) subsequent (risk-adjusted) returns The alphas rise 
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monotonically across the quintile portfolios as the customer return goes from low (negative) in 
portfolio 1 to high (positive) in portfolio 5.22  
The delayed response of stock prices to new information when bad news arrives can provide 
a strong incentive for short sellers to acquire information about firm’s customers and to profit by 
short-selling the firm’s stock after negative shock to customers. Therefore, in the next section of 
the study I test whether short sellers are attentive to the negative information about related firms 
and are able to profit from it. Following Asquith et al. (2005), I calculate short interest as the short 
position in a given month scaled by the number of shares outstanding reported on CRSP. With 
annual data, Dechow et al. (2001) show that changes in short interest is positively related to 
changes in prices. They suggest that short sellers take positions in stocks that experience price run-
ups and then cover as prices decline. Diether et al. (2008) use daily data to show that short sellers 
are also contrarians. Therefore, I need to control for supplier’s return in the preceding month to 
separate out the effect of firms with high return on the change in relative short interest.  
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Firm short interest and future return of related firm 
 
I investigate short interest level along the supply chain to determine whether short sellers 
incorporate supply chain information into their trading decisions. Specifically, I test the correlation 
between supplier’s (customer’s) short interest and future return or earnings surprise of its 
                                                            
22 The results for all quintiles are available upon request. In these tables, however, I just reported the alpha from 
Long short strategy.  
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customers (suppliers). 23 
4.1.1. Portfolio Approach 
 First, I use portfolio sorts in order to test the main hypotheses of my paper: the short 
interest contains information about related firms in its supply chain.  My main hypothesis has two 
parts; first I test whether firms’ short interest contain information about the future return of the 
firm’s customers and second I test whether it has information about the future return of the firm’s 
suppliers. In Table 5, I present portfolio sorts as a precursor to my main regression analysis. To 
study part one of the main hypothesis or the relation between customer firm’s short interest and 
future return of supplier firm, at the beginning of each month, I first group the sample into customer 
firm short interest (CUSS) quintiles and then rank them based on firms’ average short interest 
(SUPS) within each customer short interest (CUSS) quintile. All sorts are independent. I report 
time series averages of equally weighted monthly portfolio of supplier’s raw returns and alphas 
obtained from Fama French three factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. I skip one 
month between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. The results are shown in 
Table 5 Panel A and Panel B. Panel B shows the difference in risk adjusted return between the 
highest and lowest supplier short quantiles (on the left side) and the difference in risk adjusted 
return between the highest and lowest supplier short quantiles (on the right side). The negative 
significant correlation between supplier short interest (SUPS) and supplier future return 
(controlling for customer short interest) which is found in Panel A and B is consistent with previous 
literature that firm’s short interest is negatively related own firm’s future one month return. The 
                                                            
23 I conducted the empirical analysis for both measure of short interest, raw short interest and abnormal short interest. 
However, I didn’t find any interesting results for abnormal short interest based on Karpoff et al. (2010), therefore from 
now on by short interest I means raw short interest which is as a percentage of shares outstanding.  
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results in Panel A show that heavily shorted suppliers (SUPS5) significantly underperform lightly 
shorted suppliers (SUPS1) by 0.90% to 1.53% raw return (0.96% to 1.65% risk adjusted return) 
per month with t-stat ranges from 2.76 to 4.65 (t-stat ranges from 3.10 to 5.27 for risk adjusted 
return). My result, however, doesn’t show a significant relationship between firm’s future returns 
and the short interest in its customer. So customer firm’s short interest doesn’t contain any 
information about the future return of the suppliers. Results show only a positive and non- 
significant relationship between firm’s future returns and the short interest in its customer in all 
quintiles. The magnitude of raw return (risk adjusted return) between the heavily shorted 
customers and lightly shorted customers ranges from 0.25% to 0.38% (0.13% to 0.26%) but t-stat 
is not significant in any quantile.  
Next, I use portfolio approach to test whether supplier short interest contain information 
about the future return of customer firms. Following the same methodology, each month, I first 
group the sample into supplier firm short interest (SUPS) quintiles and then rank them based on 
customer firms’ average short interest (CUSS) within each supplier short interest (SUPS) quintile. 
All sorts are independent. The results are shown in Table 5 Panel B. The question is whether there 
is information in supplier short interest about the future return of customer firms, therefore, I report 
time series averages of equally weighted monthly portfolio returns of customers. I skip a month 
between the portfolio formation period and the holding period. My result shows a negative 
significant relationship between customer firm’s future returns and the short interest in its supplier. 
Panel C shows that in quantile 5 (CUSS5), heavily shorted suppliers underperform lightly shorted 
suppliers by 0.38% monthly raw return with t-stat of 1.73.  So supplier firm’s short interest 
contains information about the future return of the customers. But the informativeness of supplier 
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short interest about the future return of customer happens in the quantile where customers are 
heavily shorted, therefore one explanation of the result might be short sale constraint in customer 
firms.  I will test this hypothesis in section IV. Panel D shows the risk adjusted abnormal returns 
for customer firms for the difference between heavily and lightly shorted suppliers and customers. 
Controlling for market factor, magnitude of alpha increases slightly from 0.38% (t-stat=1.73) to 
0.44% (t-stat=1.96). When we include Fama French three factors, the magnitude of alpha does not 
change significantly and is 0.35% (with t-stat of 1.67). However, adjusting for Carhart momentum 
factor, the magnitude of abnormal return decreases to 0.20% and is not significant anymore.24 
Panel C and D show one more interesting result. Unlike suppliers, I see no significant correlation 
between short interest and future return for customer firms. An exception is the risk adjusted return 
for the quintile where suppliers are moderately shorted (quantile 3: SUPS3) where the magnitude 
of risk adjusted return from shorting the customers that are heavily shorted and buying the 
customers that are lightly shorted is 0.45% with t-stat equal to 1.96. In other quantiles both in Panel 
C and D, there is no significant relation between the short interest and the future one month return 
for customer firms. Customer firms are very large firms so one reason that we can’t find this 
negative correlation might be the size. However, in untabulated results, I find the controlling for 
size there is no relation between customer short interest and customer on month future return, 
suggesting that size is not the reason. Panel E shows the number of links in each portfolio. 
Portfolios are balanced and there are on average 1100 firms in each portfolio.   
                                                            
24 I repeated the portfolio analysis for two month lagged short interest instead of one month and find slightly 
stronger results. The results are available in Appendix I.  
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4.1.2. Regression Analysis 
Table 6 to 9 show the results of regression analysis. I test whether short interest contains 
information about economically related firms. Specifically, I regress a firm’s future returns on the 
short interest in its customer or supplier, controlling for characteristics that might differentiate the 
two firms. To avoid potential bid-ask bounce effects on the estimates, I skip one month between 
dependent variable and explanatory variables in all my regression tests.  The main variable of 
interest in all regression is firm short interest (supplier’s or customer’s), and I test how it is 
correlated to the related firm’s future return at different horizons.  
First, I test whether supplier firm’s short interests contain information about the one month 
future return of customer firms. Table 6 shows the results. Model 1 is similar to my portfolio 
approach, since I only include supplier and customer short interest in the model. Other 
specifications (Model 2 to 6) control for characteristics of supplier and customer firms. For control 
variables, I use the log of market capitalization (SIZE), the log of book to market ratio (BM), 
institutional ownership (IO) and past twelve month cumulative return (MOM). The reason for 
including the past 12-month cumulative return for both customer and supplier is that price reaction 
of an easy-to-analyze firm may lead the price reaction of a complicated firm, when both are subject 
to a common shock (Cohen and Lou 2012). If a firm is a firm that is easy to analyze, then I could 
find a relationship between a firm’s future return and the related firm (either customer or supplier) 
short interest just because short interest and past returns are correlated for the related firm (Diether 
et al. 2009). This reasoning is also addressed by Akbas et al. (2016). Model 5 and 6 excludes 
customer short interest to make sure the results are not affected by a potential multicollinearity 
problem. The results in Table 6 show that, a customer’s future one-month return is negatively and 
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significantly related to supplier firm short interest.  The coefficients for supplier short interest in 
all models are negative and significant and range from -0.027 to -0.036 with t-stat ranging from -
4.45 to -5.31. The result shows that supplier short interest contains information about the future 
return of customer firms because the higher the short interest in supplier the lower is the one-month 
future return of customer firm. In other words, one percent increase in supplier firm’s short interest 
is associated with approximately 0.03% decrease in the customer firm’s future one month return. 
Unlike the portfolio result we see a negative correlation between customer short interest and 
customer one month future return. The magnitude of the predictive power of supplier short interest 
about the customer firm’s future one month return is more than half of the magnitude of the 
predicting power of customer’s own short interest.  
Looking at the customer firm characteristics as control variables, we see that the coefficient 
of SIZE if negative but not significant. BM and MOM are positively and significantly related to 
the firm’s future return and the coefficient of IO is also positive but insignificant. Examining the 
characteristics of supplier firm as control variables in Model 4 to 6, we can notice that supplier 
size is negatively and significantly related to future return of customer firms. The other variables 
are positive but insignificant except for the last model where I exclude the customer firms’ 
characteristics from the model. Overall, the results in his table show that after controlling for firm 
characteristics, the economic magnitude and significance of the coefficient of supplier short 
interest doesn’t change significantly.  
Table 6 shows that supplier short sale is informative about the customer’s one month future 
return. Next, I examine whether the negative relation lasts for longer return horizons. Specifically 
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I test the relation between supplier short interest and customer firm’s future twelve month 
cumulative return. I repeat the analysis for Table 6 but this time the dependent variable is customer 
firm’s future twelve month cumulative return. Instead of customer’s future one month return. 
Considering the Longer horizons helps to determine whether the negative relation between 
supplier short interest and customer future return is transient or not. If the negative relation reverses 
when we consider longer return horizon, it would indicate that the return effect is likely not based 
on information and is a temporary effect. The results are shown in Table 7. The coefficient for 
supplier short remains negative and significant in all model specifications. However, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is much higher when we consider the longer return horizon as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient for supplier short ranges from -0.327 to -0.510 with t-stat 
ranging from -4.52 to -5.31. The results show that the return effect is based on information and 
does not reverse after 12 month. I can conclude that supplier short interest is economically 
important, both in an absolute sense and relative to the well-established short-interest effect on 
customer’s future returns. 
Next, I study whether customer short interest has information about the future return of 
supplier firms. The result of regression analysis is shown in Table 8. The results show that there is 
no significant relation between customer short interest and future return of supplier firm. However, 
I see a negative and significant relation between supplier short and supplier’s own future ne month 
return. When the dependent variable is longer return horizon (Table 9) I can see that coefficient of 
Customer short interest (CUSS) becomes positive and significant.  
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4.2. Firm Short Interest and Future Earnings Surprise of Related Firm 
Zhu (2014) studies whether market underreact to customer earnings announcement as a 
result of investors’ inattention. Therefore, in this section, I estimate the cross-firm effects of short 
interest on earnings surprises. Short sellers are known to be informed about upcoming earnings 
announcements (Christophe et al. 2004; Akbas et al. 2013), therefore I expect changes in firms’ 
short interest to reflect the information about the future earnings of related firms. I repeat the main 
regression analysis where quarterly earnings surprises are the dependent variables. I construct 
earnings surprises from quarterly earnings announcements from Compustat. I use standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE) as a proxy for earnings surprises. Following Foster et al. (1984) and 
Chan et al. (1996), I define SUE in quarter q as: 
                                                  𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑞 =
(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑞 − 𝐸[𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑞])
𝜎𝑞
⁄                                                 (2.3) 
Where q is the quarter, EPSq are the most recent quarterly earnings per share, E[EPSq] are 
expected earnings per share, and σq is the standard deviation of unexpected earnings (EPSq – 
E[EPSq]) over the preceding eight quarters. Similar to the previous section, I first use the portfolio 
approach and then apply multivariate regression analysis.  
4.2.1. Portfolio Approach 
 First, I use portfolio sorts in order to test whether the short interest contains information 
about the earnings of related firms in its supply chain.  In Table 10, I present portfolio sorts. To 
study the relation between customer firm’s short interest and future earnings of supplier firm, at 
the beginning of each month, I first group the sample into customer firm short interest (CUSS) 
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quintiles and then rank them based on firms’ average short interest (SUPS) within each customer 
short interest (CUSS) quintile. All sorts are independent. I report time series averages of equally 
weighted quarterly portfolio of supplier’s earnings surprises. I skip one month between the 
portfolio formation period and the holding period. The results are shown in Table 10 Panel A. The 
negative significant correlation between supplier short interest (SUPS) and supplier future earnings 
(controlling for customer short interest) which is found in Panel A is consistent with previous 
literature that firm’s short interest is negatively related own firm’s future earnings surprise. The 
results in Panel A show that heavily shorted suppliers (SUPS5) significantly underperform lightly 
shorted suppliers (SUPS1).  My result, however, doesn’t show a significant relationship between 
firm’s future earnings surprise and the short interest in its customer. So customer firm’s short 
interest doesn’t contain any information about the future earnings of the suppliers. Results show a 
negative and non- significant relationship between firm’s future earnings surprise and the short 
interest in its customer in most quintiles.  
Next, I use portfolio approach to test whether supplier short interest contain information 
about the future earnings surprise of customer firms. Following the same methodology, each 
month, I first group the sample into supplier firm short interest (SUPS) quintiles and then rank 
them based on customer firms’ average short interest (CUSS) within each supplier short interest 
(SUPS) quintile. All sorts are independent. The results are shown in Table 10 Panel B. The 
question is whether there is information in supplier short interest about the future earnings surprise 
of customer firms, therefore, I report time series averages of equally weighted quarterly portfolio 
earnings surprise of customers. I skip a month between the portfolio formation period and the 
holding period. My result shows a negative significant relationship between customer firm’s 
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earnings surprise and the short interest in its supplier. Panel B shows that in quantile 5 (CUSS5), 
heavily shorted suppliers underperform lightly shorted suppliers by 0.15% quarterly earnings 
surprise with t-stat of -1.78.  So supplier firm’s short interest contains information about the future 
earnings of the customers. But the informativeness of supplier short interest about the future 
earnings of customer happens in the quantile where customers are heavily shorted, this is again 
consistent with the previous section where I consider the stock return as variable of interest instead 
of earnings surprise. Therefore one explanation of the result might be short sale constraint in 
customer firms.  In section V, I find evidence that one reason for short sellers to short suppliers is 
customer firms’ short sale constraint. Again, Panel B shows one more interesting result. Unlike 
suppliers, we see no significant correlation between short interest and future earnings surprise for 
customer firms.  
4.2.2. Regression Analysis 
Table 11 and 12 show the results of regression analysis. I test whether short interest 
contains information about the earnings of economically related firms. Specifically, I regress a 
firm’s future earnings surprise on the short interest in its customer or supplier, controlling for 
characteristics that might differentiate the two firms. To avoid potential bid-ask bounce effects on 
the estimates, I skip one month between dependent variable and explanatory variables in all my 
regression tests.  The main variable of interest in all regression is firm short interest (supplier’s or 
customer’s), and I test how it is correlated to the related firm’s future earnings surprise.  
First, I test whether supplier firm’s short interests contain information about the next 
quarter earnings surprise of customer firms. Table 11 shows the results. Model 1 is similar to my 
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portfolio approach, since I only include supplier and customer short interest in the model. Other 
specifications (Model 2 to 6) control for characteristics of supplier and customer firms. For control 
variables, I use the log of market capitalization (SIZE), the log of book to market ratio (BM), 
institutional ownership (IO) and one quarter lagged surprise for both supplier and customer (lag 
SUE). The reason for including past earnings surprise is to make sure the results are not driven by 
the earnings momentum effect (Chan et al. 1996). Model 5 and 6 excludes customer short interest 
to make sure the results are not affected by a potential multicollinearity problem. The results in 
Table 11 show that, a customer’s future earnings surprise is negatively and significantly related to 
supplier firm short interest.  The coefficients for supplier short interest in all models except model 
1 are negative and significant and range from -0.027 to -0.036 with t-stat ranging from -1.87 to -
2.74. The result shows that supplier short interest contains information about the future earnings 
of customer firms because the higher the short interest in supplier the lower is the next quarter 
earnings surprise of customer firm. In other words, one percent increase in supplier firm’s short 
interest is associated with approximately 0.003% decrease in the customer firm’s future earnings 
surprise. 25 
Looking at the customer firm characteristics as control variables, we see that the coefficient 
of SIZE is positive but and significant at 1% level. BM and IO are not significant and one quarter 
lagged earnings surprise of customer firms is positively and significantly related to the next quarter 
earnings surprise of customer firm. Examining the characteristics of supplier firm as control 
variables in Model 4 to 6, we can notice that supplier size and lagged surprise is positively and 
                                                            
25 Considering the information content of two month lagged short interest the coefficient of the two month lagged 
short interest is around -0.005 and t-value of -3.33. 
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significantly related to future earnings surprise of customer firms. The other variables are 
insignificant. Overall, the results in his table show that after controlling for firm characteristics, 
the economic magnitude and significance of the coefficient of supplier short interest doesn’t 
change significantly.  
Next, I study whether customer short interest has information about the earnings of supplier 
firms in the next quarter. The result of regression analysis is shown in Table 12. The results show 
that there is a significant negative relation between customer short interest and future earnings 
surprise of supplier firm. The results in Table 12 show that, a supplier’s future earnings surprise is 
negatively and significantly related to customer firm short interest.  The coefficients for customer 
short interest in all models are negative and significant and range from -0.007 to -0.014 with t-stat 
ranging from -2.03 to -2.74. The result shows that customer short interest contains information 
about the future earnings of supplier firms because the higher the short interest in customer the 
lower is the next quarter earnings surprise of supplier firm. In other words, one percent increase in 
customer firm’s short interest is associated with approximately 0.008% decrease in the supplier 
firm’s future earnings surprise.26  In addition, consistent with previous literature, there is a negative 
and significant relation between supplier short and supplier’s own earnings surprise.  
4.3. Short Sellers’ Incentive to Short Suppliers or Customers: 
4.3.1. Short Sale Constraint 
One plausible channel that explains the information content of short interest for related 
firms’ stocks along the supply chain would be short sale constraints. The negative relationship in 
                                                            
26 Considering the information content of two month lagged short interest the coefficient of the two month lagged 
short interest for customer firm is around -0.01 and t-value of -1.79. 
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Table 5 Panel B (Table 10 Panel B) between firm short interest and future returns (earnings 
surprise) of customer firm is driven mainly by stocks with the highest customer’s short interest. 
Thus a firm’s short interest predicts future stocks returns of the firm’s customers mostly when the 
level of short interest in the customer firm is high.   A possible explanation would be when short 
sellers have negative information about a firm they start shorting the firm’s stock until short selling 
constraint binds. Fully exploiting firm-specific private information may be costly when shorting 
constraints bind. These informed traders, to reduce their trading costs, may then have incentives 
to strategically make information-based trades in the stocks of supplier firms. In other words, short 
sellers are generally better informed and they understand the link between firm’s and its customers. 
Hence, if they have negative information about a firm such as Apple, they not only short Apple’s 
stock but also Apple’s suppliers.  
To test for the effect of short sale constraints, I create a dummy variable that takes one if 
the customer firm falls in the decile with the highest level of short interest. Then I consider the 
interaction term between supplier firm short interest and the dummy variable. In particular, I test 
the following regression: 
𝐶𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑆_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡   (2.4) 
𝐶𝑆𝑈𝐸  is the earnings surprise for customer firm in next quarter. The dummy variable, 
𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑆_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ proxies for short sale constraints in customer firm.  If short sale constraint is the 
reason for the negative correlation between supplier short interest and future earnings surprise of 
customer firm, then we expect that the higher the short sale constraint in customer firm, then the 
stronger is the negative correlation between the two aforementioned variables. For this purpose, I 
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consider the interaction term of supplier’s short interest and the dummy whether the customer is 
highly shorted. The results in Table 13 show that the coefficient of the variable of interest which 
is the interaction term is negative and significant at 5% level. This means that short sale constraint 
might be one motivation for short sellers to short the supplier firm when they have pessimistic 
view about the customer firm.  
To test the incentive of short sellers for betting against the customer firms when they have 
pessimistic views about the supplier firm, I follow the same methodology. Supplier firms are much 
smaller than customer firms. According to D’Avolio (2002), Chen et al. (2002) and Boehmer and 
Zhang (2008), smaller firms are considered less liquid and more costly to short. So the smaller the 
firm the more the short sale constraint binds. Therefore, I test whether short sale constraints in 
supplier firm again is a motivation for short sellers to short their customers. The following 
regression is done to test the effect of short sale constraint on the relation between customer short 
interest and future earnings surprise of supplier firms.  
𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑆𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡                   (2.5) 
𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸  is the earnings surprise for supplier firm in next quarter. The dummy variable, 
𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑆_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ proxies for short sale constraints in customer firm.  If short sale constraint is the 
reason for the negative correlation between customer short interest and future earnings surprise of 
supplier firm, then we expect that the higher the short sale constraint in supplier firm, then the 
stronger is the negative correlation between the two aforementioned variables. For this purpose, I 
consider the interaction term of customer’s short interest and the dummy whether the supplier is 
highly shorted. The results in Table 14 show that the coefficient of the variable of interest which 
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is the interaction term is negative and significant at 1% level. This means that short sale constraint 
might be one motivation for short sellers to short the customer firm when they have pessimistic 
view about the supplier firm.  
4.3.2. Alternative Explanation 
Another possible reason for short sellers’ incentives to short the supplier firm when they 
have negative views about the customer firm might be because short sellers have informational 
advantage in suppliers. According to Boehmer and Zhang (2008), the relative short measure has 
opposite correlation to the market cap. They find that large stocks have light shorting compared to 
small stocks when we scale the shorting measure by the number of shares outstanding. Although 
smaller stocks are more expensive to short (Geczy et al. 2002), the higher relative short interest in 
suppliers comparing to customers specially during recent years (shown in summary statistics table) 
might be because short sellers have more information advantage in small stocks. The higher 
informational advantage comes from the fact that smaller stocks have relative shortage of research 
coverage and other readily available sources of information.  
5. Conclusion 
Several papers have shown that shocks to a firm have impacts on economically connected 
firms (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010, Cohen and Fazzini, 2008, Pandit et al. 2011). In particular, the 
ripple effect from shocks to customer firms’ impacts linked supplier firms with a lag and vice 
versa. The prevailing explanation for this short-term price inefficiency is investor limited attention. 
Recently research has suggested that attentive corporate insiders and sell-side analysts who cover 
both customer and supplier firms incorporate information about the customer-supplier relationship 
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into their supplier trades and estimates more rapidly than their peers (Alldredge and Cicero, 2014, 
Guan et al. 2014). The focus of this study is to investigate whether short sellers are able to see 
through the complex customer-supplier relationships and exploit supply-chain information 
through trading. 
The main finding is that short sellers have predictive power; they short suppliers 
(customers) before the customers’ (suppliers’) poor performance is realized. In other words, 
supplier short sale has information about the future return and earning surprise of customers.  
Moreover, the effect I document predicts returns up to a year ahead, suggesting that the price 
impact is permanent, not transient. In addition customer short sale has information about the future 
earnings surprise of supplier firms. These results support the idea that my findings are driven by 
informed trading. I argue that short sellers may strategically choose to trade a supplier’s stock 
because of short sale constraints and informational advantage. I find consistent results with this 
explanation. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Short interest in Apple and its two main suppliers 
This figure shows the trend in short interest in Apple’s two main supplier firms, Hon Hain and Pegatron. 
Apple announced negative earnings in April 2016, but short interest in Apple’s suppliers reached a 
crescendo in February.  
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Figure 2.2. Comparing Supplier and Customer firms’ average annual short interest 
 
This figure presents time-series averages for short interest. The sample consists of common stocks listed 
on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. Monthly short interest data is defined as the total shares 
shorted divided by the total shares outstanding measured at the midst of each month. 
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Table 2.1. Customer-supplier Summary statistics: 
This table shows summary statistics as of December of each year. Panel A. shows the time series statistics 
for link characteristics. Panel B is pooled firm year statistics and Panel C presents time-series averages of 
statistics for various stock characteristics.  SIZE is the market value of equity calculated as the previous 
month end number of shares outstanding times share price. BM is the ratio of the previous quarter end book 
value to market value of equity. TURN is the share turnover ratio measured as the number of shares traded 
divided by the number of shares outstanding in a given month. IO is the institutional ownership, defined as 
the sum of the holdings of all institutions for each stock in each quarter, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. MOM is cumulative return over the past twelve months for a stock. Earnings surprise is 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) defined as difference in Earnings per Share (EPS) before 
extraordinary items between quarters q and q-4 divided by quarter q-4 end price I apply log transformation 
for BM and Size.  
 
 Min Max Mean SD Median 
Panel A: Time Series (34 Annual Observations, 1981–2015) 
Number of suppliers in the sample per year 267 1,686 1,158 388 1,244 
Number of customers in the sample per year 346 688 555 90 552 
% of supplier–customer in the same industry 22.0 29.0 26.0 2.9 23.5 
Link duration (years) 1.0 34.0 4.2 3.3 3.0 
Panel B :Firms (Pooled Firm-Year Observations) 
Number of customers per firm 1.0 21.0 1.7 1.1 1.0 
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Panel C :  Summary statistics 
 Mean Median SD P1 P99 
Supplier BM 0.68 0.54 0.71 -0.40 4.16 
Customer BM 0.60 0.49 0.49 -0.49 2.75 
Supplier Size ($ Million)  930.40 104.74 2,776.95 1.56 20,140.75 
Customer Size ($ Million) 11,309.88 2,335.77 26,584.00 11.48 177,054.00 
Supplier Profitability (%) -1.25 0.76 7.79 -42.79 12.05 
Customer Profitability (%) 0.79 1.18 3.31 -17.60 7.27 
Supplier MOM (%) 15.02 2.42 72.17 -86.89 357.14 
Customer MOM (%) 13.41 10.21 39.21 -73.33 159.13 
Supplier Institutional Ownership  0.30 0.20 0.32 0.00 1.08 
Customer Institutional Ownership  0.47 0.53 0.33 0.00 1.07 
Supplier Return (%) 1.06 0.00 17.15 -43.01 66.67 
Customer Return (%) 1.12 0.95 11.37 -28.81 33.45 
Supplier SUE (%) -0.08 0.13 11.91 -59.35 59.75 
Customer SUE (%) -0.05 0.14 4.62 -24.00 21.00 
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Table 2.2. Short sale statistics (1988-2015) 
Panel A. presents time-series averages of cross-sectional summary statistics for short interest. The sample 
consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. Monthly short interest 
data in Panel A. is defined as the percentage of total shares shorted divided by the total shares outstanding 
measured at the midst of each month. For each month t, short interest (SI) is regressed on variables that are 
likely to explain the level of short interest. Short interest (SI) is the number of shares shorted as a percentage 
of the number of shares outstanding. The table reports the time-series means and t-statistics of the monthly 
coefficient estimates. For Panel B:  
 
𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗=𝑙𝑜𝑤
∑ 𝑚𝑗𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗=𝑙𝑜𝑤
∑ 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗=𝑙𝑜𝑤
 
 
Explanatory variables include size, the book-to-market ratio, and momentum, all measured at the beginning 
of month t. The independent variables are dummy variables. For example, if firm i is assigned to the 
portfolio with the lowest market capitalization in month t, then 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑡 = 1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑚𝑒𝑑,𝑡 = 0, and 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 = 0. Panel C. reports the coefficient of reports the mean levels of abnormal short interest 
(ABSI) for customers and suppliers in the sample. Abnormal short interest for each event firm i in month t 
is the difference between the short interest and the predicted short interest using the coefficients in month 
t. 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
Panel A. Raw relative short interest 
 
Panel B. Model Used to Calculate Abnormal Short Interest 
 
 
 
 Mean Median STD P1 P99 
Short in universe (%) 2.16 1.36 1.75 0.31 6.34 
Customers’ Short (%) 2.50 2.41 1.27 0.23 6.41 
Suppliers’ Short (%) 2.32 1.64 1.88 0.25 6.56 
 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑀𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐵𝑀𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑑 
Industry 
Controls 
R-
squared 
Model to 
calculate 
ABSI 
-2.19*** -0.10*** 0.74*** -0.04*** 0.62*** -0.15*** 
Yes 23.22% 
(-27.15) (-3.89) (26.50) (-4.60) (17.21) (-15.01) 
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Panel C. Abnormal relative short interest 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Median STD P1 P99 
Customers’ Short (%) -1.04 -0.45 1.24 -5.14 0.13 
Suppliers’ Short (%) 0.03 0.03 0.47 -0.90 0.65 
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Table 2.3. Correlation matrix. 
This table present the correlations among the variables. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 
2015. Monthly short interest data is defined as the percentage of total shares shorted divided by the total shares outstanding measured at the midst 
of each month. SIZE is the market value of equity calculated as the previous month end number of shares outstanding times share price. BM is the 
ratio of the previous quarter end book value to market value of equity. IO is the institutional ownership, defined as the sum of the holdings of all 
institutions for each stock in each quarter, divided by the number of shares outstanding. MOM is cumulative return over the past twelve months for 
a stock. Earnings surprise is standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) defined as difference in Earnings per Share (EPS) before extraordinary items 
between quarters q and q-4 divided by quarter q-4 end price I apply log transformation for BM and Size.  
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Supplier Short 1.00              
Customer Short 0.13 1.00             
Customer Size 0.10 -0.25 1.00            
Customer BM -0.07 0.05 -0.44 1.00           
Customer IO 0.16 0.23 0.01 -0.08 1.00          
Customer MOM -0.04 -0.04 0.11 -0.14 0.01 1.00         
Supplier CUM 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.24 1.00        
Customer Ret -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00       
Supplier Ret -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.22 1.00      
Customer SUE -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.02 1.00     
Supplier SUE -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.07 1.00    
Supplier Size 0.34 0.06 0.18 -0.05 0.11 0.02 0.18 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00   
Supplier BM -0.20 -0.01 -0.05 0.16 -0.04 -0.05 -0.18 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.32 1.00  
Supplier IO 0.40 0.11 0.16 -0.05 0.18 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 -0.09 1.00 
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Table 2.4. Customer Momentum Strategy, Abnormal Returns  
This table shows calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns. At the beginning of every calendar month, 
stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the return of a portfolio of its principal customers at 
the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of five quintile portfolios. All stocks 
are equal weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to 
maintain equal weights. Alpha is the intercept on a regression of monthly excess return from the rolling 
strategy. The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking 
portfolios and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. L/S is the alpha of a zero-cost portfolio that holds the 
top 20% high customer return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low customer return stocks. Returns 
and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. 
 
Panel A. Customer Momentum Strategy, Abnormal Returns 1981–2015 
 
L/S portfolios  
EW - Customer 
MOM 
VW - Customer 
MOM 
EW - Customer 
MOM 
VW - Customer 
MOM 
Alpha 1.07%*** 0.85%*** 0.96%*** 0.83%*** 
  (6.68) (3.16) (5.97) (3.18) 
MKT -0.06 -0.073 -0.06 -0.07 
 -(1.28) -(0.89) -(1.26) -(0.83) 
SMB -0.01 -0.17 -0.01 -0.14 
  -(0.12) -(1.39) -(0.07) -(1.16) 
HML 0.04 0.097 0.04 0.10 
  (0.58) (0.86) (0.58) (0.88) 
UMD     0.13*** 0.02 
       (3.64) (0.45) 
 
Panel B. Customer Momentum Strategy, Abnormal Returns 1981–2004 
 
L/S portfolios  
EW - Customer 
MOM 
VW - Customer 
MOM 
EW - Customer 
MOM 
VW - Customer 
MOM 
Alpha 1.33%*** 1.26%*** 1.18%*** 1.16%** 
  (5.92) (2.31) (5.07) (2.17) 
MKT -0.08 -0.061 -0.87 -0.045 
 -(1.16) -(1.04) -(1.12) -(0.74) 
SMB -0.01 -0.113 -0.01 -0.115 
  -(0.17) -(1.34) -(0.14) -(1.37) 
HML 0.00 0.049 0.00 0.069 
  (0.09) (0.55) (0.11) (0.77) 
UMD     0.16*** 0.058 
       (3.78) (1.06) 
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Table 2.5. Average portfolio returns 
This table presents average raw returns ( %) for portfolios sorted on monthly short interest, SUPS, and 
monthly short interest for the customer, CUSS. Monthly short interest data in Panel A. is defined as the 
percentage of total shares shorted divided by the total shares outstanding measured at the midst of each 
month.  The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from June 1988 through 
December 2015. The portfolios are rebalanced every month and I skip a month between portfolio formation 
and the holding period. Panel A shows the results for average returns of suppliers and Panel B shows the 
results for average returns of customers. The table also presents the average returns of the high-minus-low 
short interest, within each short interest group. All sorts are independently conducted. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Supplier’s average raw return  
  SUPS1 SUPS2 SUPS3 SUPS4 SUPS5 SUPS5- SUPS1 t 
CUSS1 1.23 1.09 1.03 0.72 0.33 -0.90*** -2.83 
CUSS 2 1.50 1.23 0.80 1.21 0.57 -0.93*** -2.76 
CUSS 3 1.78 1.06 0.97 1.20 0.25 -1.53*** -4.65 
CUSS4 1.49 1.67 1.04 1.10 0.62 -0.87*** -2.80 
CUSS5 1.56 1.37 1.28 1.10 0.63 -0.93*** -2.82 
CUSS5 – CUSS1 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.38 0.30   
t 1.28 1.10 0.95 1.45 1.03   
Panel B. Supplier’s average risk adjusted abnormal return  
SUPS5- SUPS1 CUSS5 – CUSS1 
  
Excess 
Return 
One 
Factor 
Alpha 
Three 
Factor 
Alpha 
Four 
Factor 
Alpha 
  
Excess 
Return 
One 
Factor 
Alpha 
Three 
Factor 
Alpha 
Four 
Factor 
Alpha 
CUSS1 -0.90*** -1.19*** -1.00*** -0.96*** SUPS1 0.38 0.25 0.28 0.23 
 (-2.83) (-3.87) (-3.30) (-3.10)  (1.28) (1.00) (1.10) (0.89) 
CUSS2 -0.93*** -1.23*** -1.16*** -1.12*** SUPS2 0.28 0.15 0.08 0.13 
 (-2.76) (-3.83) (-3.58) (-3.38)  (1.10) (0.59) (0.31) (0.50) 
CUSS3 -1.53*** -1.88*** -1.74*** -1.65*** SUPS3 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.25 
 (-4.65) (-6.08) (-5.66) (-5.27)  (0.95) (0.75) (0.63) (0.92) 
CUSS4 -0.87*** -1.16*** -1.00*** -0.98*** SUPS4 0.38 0.23 0.32 0.26 
 (-2.80) (-3.90) (-3.38) (-3.26)  (1.45) (0.93) (1.27) (1.02) 
CUSS5 -0.93*** -1.22*** -1.14*** -1.07*** SUPS5 0.30 0.22 0.15 0.13 
 (-2.82) (-3.84) (-3.56) (-3.28)  (1.03) (0.77) (0.52) (0.43) 
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Panel C. Customer’s average raw return 
  SUPS1 SUPS2 SUPS3 SUPS4 SUPS5 SUPS5- SUPS1 t 
CUSS1 0.92 1.07 1.00 0.94 0.93 0.02 0.10 
CUSS 2 1.17 1.09 1.36 1.11 1.10 -0.06 -0.41 
CUSS 3 1.14 1.04 1.09 1.04 1.26 0.11 0.57 
CUSS4 1.28 1.28 1.13 1.10 1.11 -0.17 -0.88 
CUSS5 1.22 1.00 0.73 0.92 0.84 -0.38* -1.73 
CUSS5 – CUSS1 0.31 -0.07 -0.27 -0.02 -0.09   
t 1.24 -0.31 -1.12 -0.09 -0.33   
Panel D. Customer’s average risk adjusted abnormal return  
SUPS5- SUPS1 CUSS5 – CUSS1 
  
Excess 
Return 
One 
Factor 
Alpha 
Three 
Factor 
Alpha 
Four 
Factor 
Alpha 
  
Excess 
Return 
One 
Factor 
Alpha 
Three 
Factor 
Alpha 
Four 
Factor 
Alpha 
CUSS1 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.10 SUPS1 0.31 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 
 (0.10) (-0.24) (0.15) (0.63)  (1.24) (-0.01) (-0.10) (0.35) 
CUSS2 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 SUPS2 -0.07 -0.28 -0.33 -0.13 
 (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.20) (0.07)  (-0.31) (-1.20) (-1.48) (-0.60) 
CUSS3 0.11 0.08 0.26 0.30 SUPS3 -0.27 -0.51** -0.57** -0.45** 
 (0.57) (0.40) (1.28) (1.55)  (-1.12) (-2.17) (-2.54) (-1.98) 
CUSS4 -0.17 -0.21 -0.06 -0.06 SUPS4 -0.02 -0.24 -0.32 -0.19 
 (-0.88) (-1.11) (-0.34) (-0.33)  (-0.09) (-1.09) (-1.48) (-0.86) 
CUSS5 -0.38* -0.44* -0.35* -0.20 SUPS5 -0.09 -0.40 -0.40 -0.23 
 (-1.73) (-1.96) (-1.67) (-1.20)  (-0.33) (-1.55) (-1.61) (-0.93) 
 
Panel E. Average monthly number of links in each portfolio 
  SUPS1 SUPS2 SUPS3 SUPS4 SUPS5 
CUSS1 1097 1114 1114 1114 1099 
CUSS 2 1101 1114 1121 1116 1105 
CUSS 3 1099 1124 1116 1115 1103 
CUSS4 1091 1129 1118 1118 1103 
CUSS5 1093 1122 1113 1112 1102 
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Table 2.6. Regression analysis - Short Interest and Customer’s One Month Future Return 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variables are customer’s future one month return and the independent 
variables are various stock characteristics. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. 
The dependent variables are raw stock returns and one month is skipped between measurement of the independent and dependent variables. 
I apply log transformations to SIZE and BM. All variables are winsorized at 1% .All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are 
reported below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Supplier Short -0.034*** -0.032***  -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.036** 
 (-5.31) (-5.23)  (-4.45) (-5.02) (-5.28) 
Customer Short -0.061*** -0.043** -0.049** -0.055**   
 (-2.69) (-1.99) (-2.37) (-2.44)   
Customer Size  -0.022 -0.032 -0.023 0.005  
  (-0.93) (-1.37) (-0.97) (0.24)  
Customer BM  0.281*** 0.292*** 0.291*** 0.292***  
  (3.38) (3.85) (3.92) (3.95)  
Customer IO  0.067 0.018 0.120 0.036  
  (0.52) (0.14) (0.86) (0.26)  
Customer MOM  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***  
  (5.91) (5.95) (5.93) (5.85)  
Supplier Size    -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.042** 
    (-3.02) (-3.08) (-2.75) 
Supplier BM    0.033 0.028 0.077* 
    (0.94) (0.81) (1.89) 
Supplier IO    0.061 0.029 0.054 
    (0.66) (0.32) (0.62) 
Supplier MOM    -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
    (-1.18) (-1.04) (1.89) 
Intercept 1.152*** 1.492*** 1.559*** 1.721*** 1.415*** 1.267** 
 (22.65) (7.33) (7.71) (8.41) (7.39) (17.52) 
R-squared 0.054% 0.239% 0.221% 0.249% 0.229% 0.041% 
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Table 2.7. Regression analysis - Short Interest and Customer’s 12 Month Future Return 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variables are customer’s returns. The independent variables are 
various stock characteristics. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. The dependent 
variables are raw stock returns and one month is skipped between measurement of the independent and dependent variables. I apply log 
transformations to SIZE and BM. All variables are winsorized at 1% .All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported below 
the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Supplier Short -0.510*** -0.362***  -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.347** 
 (-5.31) (-4.63)  (-4.52) (-4.84) (-4.95) 
Customer Short 0.417 0.253 0.174 0.078   
 (1.43) (0.69) (0.48) (0.22)   
Customer Size  -1.761*** -1.874*** -1.806*** -1.822***  
  (-5.61) (-5.99) (-5.55) (-5.73)  
Customer BM  2.928** 2.947** 2.873** 2.873**  
  (2.53) (2.50) (2.55) (2.57)  
Customer IO  -4.689** -5.289*** -4.037** -3.861**  
  (-2.47) (-2.77) (-2.06) (-2.01)  
Customer MOM  0.015 0.017 0.019 0.019  
  (0.55) (0.63) (0.75) (0.73)  
Supplier Size    -0.460** -0.460*** -0.649*** 
    (-2.58) (-2.60) (-3.76) 
Supplier BM    0.047 0.036 0.602 
    (0.10) (0.08) (1.12) 
Supplier IO    1.116 1.183 -0.209 
    (1.04) (1.07) (-0.22) 
Supplier MOM    -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.021*** 
    (-3.57) (-3.52) (-4.48) 
Intercept 14.839*** 36.355*** 36.910*** 38.823*** 39.002*** 19.388** 
 (24.65) (12.02) (12.26) (12.41) (12.96) (19.60) 
R-squared 0.214% 1.390% 1.298% 1.507% 1.500% 0.398% 
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Table 2.8. Regression analysis - Short Interest and Supplier’s One Month Future Return 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variables are supplier’s returns. The independent variables are various 
stock characteristics. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. The dependent 
variables are raw stock returns and one month is skipped between measurement of the independent and dependent variables. I apply log 
transformations to SIZE and BM. All variables are winsorized at 1% .All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported below 
the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Customer Short 0.008 -0.008  0.007 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.65) (-0.66)  (0.48) (-0.36) (0.33) 
Supplier Short -0.099*** -0.085*** -0.087** -0.087**   
 (-9.55) (-7.07) (-4.30) (-7.11)   
Supplier Size  -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.125***  
  (-4.25) (-4.30) (-4.13) (-5.03)  
Supplier BM  0.687*** 0.682*** 0.635*** 0.685***  
  (10.68) (10.55) (9.46) (10.24)  
Supplier IO  0.866*** 0.881*** 0.819*** 0.522***  
  (5.84) (5.96) (5.29) (3.74)  
Supplier MOM  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***  
  (6.96) (6.54) (4.76) (4.91)  
Customer Size    0.019 0.007 0.028 
    (0.92) (0.34) (1.48) 
Customer BM    0.212*** 0.216*** 0.367*** 
    (3.60) (3.65) (6.55) 
Customer IO    0.229** 0.157 0.177* 
    (2.14) (1.48) (1.76) 
Customer MOM    0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
    (7.49) (7.86) (8.70) 
Intercept 1.177*** 1.838*** 1.824*** 1.629*** 1.839*** 0.801*** 
 (25.21) (16.50) (16.65) (8.02) (9.00) (4.28) 
R-squared 0.051% 0.213% 0.208% 0.242% 0.207% 0.053% 
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Table 2.9. Regression analysis - Short Interest and Supplier’s 12 Month Future Return 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variable is supplier’s 12 month cumulative returns. The independent 
variables are various stock characteristics. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. 
The dependent variables are raw stock returns and one month is skipped between measurement of the independent and dependent variables. 
I apply log transformations to SIZE and BM. All variables are winsorized at 1% .All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are 
reported below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Customer Short 0.946*** 0.759***  0.752*** 0.596** 0.612*** 
 (4.93) (3.60)  (3.10) (2.47) (2.75) 
Supplier Short -1.521*** -0.954*** -0.901*** -1.066***   
 (-12.19) (-6.24) (-5.93) (-6.80)   
Supplier Size  -3.259*** -3.266*** -3.435*** -3.716***  
  (-7.96) (-7.97) (-7.53) (-7.95)  
Supplier BM  5.148*** 5.160*** 5.002*** 5.707***  
  (5.86) (5.87) (5.62) (6.53)  
Supplier IO  4.947** 5.456** 5.441** 1.532  
  (2.23) (2.46) (2.31) (0.70)  
Supplier MOM  -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.046*** -0.044***  
  (-5.39) (-5.52) (-4.58) (-4.36)  
Customer Size    -0.048 -0.188 -0.619** 
    (-0.14) (-0.57) (-2.22) 
Customer BM    -0.703 -0.661 0.175 
    (-0.71) (-0.66) (0.19) 
Customer IO    3.784** 2.944 0.068 
    (2.06) (1.61) (0.04) 
Customer MOM    -0.029* -0.024 -0.054*** 
    (-1.90) (-1.59) (-3.62) 
Intercept 19.705*** 38.462*** 39.708*** 37.805*** 40.386*** 23.424*** 
 (27.07) (17.50) (18.00) (11.36) (12.24) (8.77) 
R-squared 0.461% 1.515% 1.471% 1.588% 1.416% 0.111% 
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Table 2.10. Average portfolio earnings surprise 
This table presents average returns (in %) for portfolios sorted on monthly short interest, SUPS, and 
monthly short interest for the customer, CUSS. Monthly short interest data in Panel A. is defined as the 
percentage of total shares shorted divided by the total shares outstanding measured at the midst of each 
month. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from June 1988 through 
December 2015. The portfolios are rebalanced every month and we skip a month between portfolio 
formation and the holding period. Panel A shows the results for average standardized earnings surprise of 
suppliers and Panel B shows the results for average standardized earnings surprise of customers. The table 
also presents the average returns of the high-minus-low short interest, within each short interest group. All 
sorts are independently conducted. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Average portfolio SUE for Supplier 
  SUPS1 SUPS2 SUPS3 SUPS4 SUPS5 SUPS5- SUPS1 t 
CUSS1 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.20 -0.15 -1.24 
CUSS 2 -0.08 -0.07 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.05 -0.38 
CUSS 3 0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.17* -1.78 
CUSS4 0.08 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.18 -0.26** -2.36 
CUSS5 0.08 -0.18 -0.11 -0.14 -0.24 -0.32** -2.57 
CUSS5 – CUSS1 0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.17 -0.04   
t 1.09 -0.82 -1.00 -1.46 -0.43   
        
 
Panel B. Average portfolio SUE for customers 
 SUPS1 SUPS2 SUPS3 SUPS4 SUPS5 SUPS5- SUPS1 t 
CUSS1 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.66 
CUSS 2 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -1.15 
CUSS 3 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 -1.12 
CUSS4 0.02 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.55 
CUSS5 0.14 0.04 0.18 0.07 -0.01 -0.15* -1.78 
CUSS5 – CUSS1 0.11 -0.02 0.20** 0.14 0.01   
t 1.28 -0.19 1.91 1.36 0.10   
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Table 2.11. Regression analysis - Short Interest and Customer’s Future Earnings Surprise 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variable is customer’s next quarter earnings surprise. The independent 
variables are various stock characteristics. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. 
I apply log transformations to SIZE. All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Supplier Short -0.001 -0.002*  -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003* 
 (-0.19) (-1.87)  (-2.53) (-2.74) (-1.93) 
Customer Short -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001   
 (-0.56) (-0.24) (-0.46) (-0.40)   
Customer Size  0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  
  (3.87) (3.58) (3.51) (3.55)  
Customer BM  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  
  (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.57) (-0.58)  
Customer IO  0.017 0.025 0.023 0.021  
  (1.26) (1.09) (1.00) (1.03)  
Customer Lag 
SUE  0.396*** 0.396*** 0.393*** 0.393***  
  (17.86) (17.76) (17.88) (17.93)  
Supplier Size    0.008** 0.008** 0.013** 
    (2.39) (2.39) (2.62) 
Supplier BM    0.000 0.000 -0.000 
    (0.30) (0.28) (-0.71) 
Supplier IO    -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
    (-0.31) (-0.41) (0.67) 
Supplier Lag SUE    0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
    (8.55) (8.69) (9.02) 
Intercept 0.053*** -0.079*** -0.074** -0.101*** -0.106*** -0.016*** 
 (4.70) (-2.67) (-2.50) (-3.14) (-3.14) (-0.81) 
R-squared 0.007% 15.720% 15.690% 15.940% 15.940% 6.249% 
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Table 2.12. Regression analysis - Short Interest and Supplier’s Future Earnings Surprise 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variable is supplier’s next quarter earnings surprise. The independent 
variables are various stock characteristics. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. 
I apply log transformations to SIZE. All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Customer Short -0.009** -0.007**  -0.008** -0.010*** -0.014* 
 (-2.03) (-2.11)  (-2.29) (-2.74) (-2.67) 
Supplier Short -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012***   
 (-2.77) (-3.89) (-4.07) (-4.20)   
Supplier Size  0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.015***  
  (3.82) (3.88) (3.33) (2.68)  
Supplier BM  -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*  
  (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.75) (-1.75)  
Supplier IO  -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.101***  
  (-1.14) (-1.26) (-1.59) (-2.98)  
Supplier Lag SUE  0.352*** 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.349***  
  (48.50) (48.55) (47.50) (48.50)  
Customer Size    0.004 0.003 0.004 
    (0.95) (0.70) (0.57) 
Customer BM    -0.007* -0.007 -0.011** 
    (-1.76) (-1.63) (-2.52) 
Customer IO    0.113*** 0.101*** 0.134*** 
    (4.13) (3.71) (3.58) 
Customer Lag 
SUE 
 
  0.094*** 0.094*** 0.176*** 
    (9.13) (9.09) (13.96) 
Intercept -0.011 -0.103*** -0.118*** -0.175*** -0.150*** -0.131* 
 (-0.63) (-3.18) (-3.56) (-3.14) (-2.69) (-1.86) 
R-squared 0.004% 12.330% 12.330% 12.550% 12.550% 6.120% 
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Table 2.13. Customer’s Short sale constraint 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variable is customer’s next quarter 
earnings surprise. The independent variables are various stock characteristics. The sample consists of 
common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. I apply log transformations to 
SIZE. All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable “ Customer  Earnings Surprise  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Supplier Short -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.13) (-0.25) 
Customer Short 0.002 0.001 
 (0.51) (0.58) 
Customer Size 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (3.51) (3.71) 
Customer BM -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.57) (-0.62) 
Customer IO 0.021 0.023 
 (1.05) (1.11) 
Customer Lag surprise 0.393*** 0.393*** 
 (17.89) (17.92) 
Supplier Size 0.008**  
 (2.36)  
Supplier BM 0.000  
 (0.30)  
Supplier IO -0.006  
 (-0.29)  
Supplier Lag surprise 0.015***  
 (8.56)  
Supplier Short* Customer High Short -0.0012** -0.0012** 
 (-2.13) (-2.18) 
Intercept -0.102*** -0.082*** 
 (-3.17) (-2.76) 
R-squared 15.97% 15.75% 
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Table 2.14. Supplier’s Short sale constraint 
This table presents the results from regressions in which the dependent variable is supplier’s next quarter 
earnings surprise. The independent variables are various stock characteristics. The sample consists of 
common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from 1988 through 2015. I apply log transformations to 
SIZE. All regressions are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: Supplier Earnings Surprise  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Customer Short -0.005 -0.004 
 (-1.27) (-0.89) 
Supplier Short -0.008** -0.007** 
 (-2.55) (-2.13) 
Supplier Size 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (3.30) (3.67) 
Supplier BM -0.004* -0.004* 
 (-1.74) (-1.74) 
Supplier IO -0.061* -0.045 
 (-1.69) (-1.27) 
Supplier lag Surprise 0.348*** 0.351*** 
 (43.81) (43.48) 
Customer Size 0.004  
 (0.86)  
Customer BM -0.007*  
 (-1.74)  
Customer IO 0.112***  
 (4.08)  
Customer lag Surprise 0.094***  
 (9.13)  
Customer Short* Supplier High Short -0.024** -0.026** 
 (-2.47) (-2.76) 
Intercept -0.175*** -0.109*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.33) 
R-squared 12.56% 12.35% 
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Appendix.  
Table 2.15. Average portfolio returns (two month lagged short interest) 
This table presents average returns (in %) for portfolios sorted on monthly short interest, S, and monthly 
short interest for the customer, CS. S and CS are relative monthly short interest and are defined as total 
shares shorted divided by the total shares outstanding measured mid-month. The sample consists of 
common stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE from June 1980 through December 2015. The portfolios are 
rebalanced every month and we skip a month between portfolio formation and the holding period. Panel A 
shows the results for average returns of suppliers and Panel B shows the results for average returns of 
customers. The table also presents the average returns of the high-minus-low short interest, within each 
short interest group. All sorts are independently conducted. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
level at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Supplier’s average return 
 SUPS1 SUPS2 SUPS3 SUPS4 SUPS5 SUPS5- SUPS1 t 
CUSS1 1.37 1.09 1.14 0.8 0.40 -0.97*** -3.04 
CUSS 2 1.10 1.49 0.83 1.09 0.77 -0.32 -0.95 
CUSS 3 1.46 1.14 1.01 1.18 0.36 -1.10*** -3.27 
CUSS4 1.15 1.63 1.44 1.08 0.53 -0.62** -2.00 
CUSS5 1.56 1.24 1.30 1.14 0.62 -0.94*** -2.80 
CUSS5 – CUSS1 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.34 0.21   
t 0.73 0.60 0.61 1.37 0.72   
        
Panel B. Customers’ average return 
  SUPS1 SUPS2 SUPS3 SUPS4 SUPS5 SUPS5- SUPS1 t 
CUSS1 0.98 1.07 1.16 0.76 0.82 -0.16 -1.01 
CUSS 2 1.16 1.24 1.14 1.22 1.25 0.09 0.61 
CUSS 3 1.14 0.99 1.06 1.21 1.20 0.06 0.29 
CUSS4 1.21 1.26 1.12 1.13 1.22 0.01 0.07 
CUSS5 1.21 0.88 0.87 1.02 0.76 -0.45** -2.17 
CUSS5 – CUSS1 0.23 -0.20 -0.29 0.26 -0.06   
t 1.01 -0.80 -1.18 1.05 -0.21   
 
 
